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Abstract 
Previous work suggests that feelings of empathic anger in adults produce motivations to both 
assist victimized others and to punish the aggressors responsible for harming the injured 
party. Little developmental work has been done exploring the occurrence and effects of 
empathic anger in younger age groups. The current study sought to identify trait-level 
predictors of empathic anger responses in adults and adolescents, and to determine whether 
empathic anger made unique contributions to helping and punishing motivations among each 
age group. Trait empathy and perspective taking failed to predict empathic anger responses in 
adolescents and adults, though trait anger emerged as a significant predictor in both age 
groups. Empathic anger significantly predicted helping desires among adults and adolescents, 
but did not predict punishing desires among either age group. Future work could expand upon 
these findings by extending them to younger samples. 
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Introduction 
Society often grapples with the question of how to prompt moral conduct from its 
members. Moral cognition has been the subject of much research, and considerable work has 
been done to try to understand how people learn and reason about concepts of right and 
wrong. But moral knowledge alone does not guarantee moral action. Even when people are 
able to identify what “the right thing to do” is in a situation, they may fail to act in 
accordance with their own beliefs and values. A motivational component is required to 
prompt people to act based on their beliefs regarding right and wrong, particularly when 
doing so would be costly for the individual (Batson, 1991; Skoe, Eisenberg, & Cumberland, 
2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Moral emotions are one powerful source of such 
motivation. 
         The term moral emotions encompasses emotions related to upholding or violating 
one’s moral principles, and can serve as an internal drive to behave in accordance with 
personal values (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Some emotions, such as guilt and 
shame, are felt after making a moral transgression. These unpleasant sensations serve as 
deterrents to future misconduct, as individuals seek to avoid the negative sensations they 
anticipate following moral misbehavior (Nelissen, & Zeelenberg, 2009; Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2007). Other moral emotions, such as empathic concern, create concern for the well-
being of others, and motivate prosocial acts towards them (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1990; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Past research has identified consistent links 
between the experience of empathic concern for a target and a willingness to assist them 
through physical aid, sharing resources, and offering emotional support and comfort, even 
when doing so is costly for the helper (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Krebs, 1975). 
Empathic concern is generally accepted as a consistent predictor of prosocial behavior, and 
has been the topic of considerable study as a result (e.g. Batson, 1987; Batson, 1991; Batson, 
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& Ahmad, 2009; Davis, 1983; Eisenberg, & Fabes, 1990; Hoffman, 2008; Roberts, Strayer, 
& Denham, 2014). However, much less is known about the related emotion of empathic 
anger. 
         Empathic anger resembles empathic concern, as both emotions involve feelings of 
tenderness and compassion towards a victimized target, and concern for their well-being. 
Empathic anger features the additional component of hostile and aggressive feelings towards 
the perceived source of the target’s suffering (Hoffman, 2000; Laible, Eye, & Carlo, 2008; 
Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). The compassionate component of empathic anger can be felt 
towards either specific individuals or larger groups, such as those living in poverty (Hoffman, 
2000; Skoe, Eisenberg, & Cumberland 2002; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). The feelings of 
anger are similarly flexible, and may be directed either towards a specific individual or a 
broader group, such as slave owners or even society as a whole (Hoffman, 1987; Hoffman, 
2000; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). The key element in determining the target of the hostile 
component of empathic anger is a sense that the target is responsible for causing unjustified 
suffering to the individual for whom concern and compassion are felt. 
         The simultaneous experience of hostile and compassionate feelings makes empathic 
anger an unusual emotion, as the behavioral motivations associated with these two sensations 
appear at odds with each other. Feelings of sympathy and concern motivate prosocial 
behaviors, such as helping and care-giving, while the experience of anger motivates 
aggressive and anti-social acts. Past work by Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) has found that 
empathic anger produces both motivations simultaneously, albeit aimed at different targets. 
This co-occurence of pro- and anti-social behavioral motivations makes empathic anger a 
potential predictor of an extremely broad range of responses, which vary not only in intensity 
but also in valence. 
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One other moral emotion that can produce a similarly broad range of behavioral 
motivations is the experience of moral outrage. While empathic anger involves feelings of 
concern for a victim’s well-being and an emotional involvement in their plight, moral outrage 
does not stem from concern for the victimized party (Batson et al., 2007; Batson, Chao, & 
Givens, 2009). Moral outrage is instead felt in response to the perceived violation of moral 
principles or rules, and involves both subjective feelings of anger and a desire to repair the 
violated moral standard (Batson, Chao, & Givens, 2009). The precise form this behavioral 
motivation takes depends upon the initial moral transgression and the nature of the rule 
violation that occurred. Feelings of moral outrage could potentially be soothed by punishing 
the transgressor, thus restoring a sense of justice and fairness. Moral outrage could also be 
alleviated by coming to the aid of a victimized party, and restoring fairness or equality by 
satisfying their needs (Batson, Chao, & Givens, 2009; Skoe, Eisenberg, & Cumberland, 
2002). 
 Although moral outrage stems from the violation of moral rules rather than human 
suffering, these two conditions tend to co-occur. Acts are often considered immoral or taboo 
specifically because they are known to cause harm to others (Graham et al., 2011). In 
practice, it is often extremely difficult to come up with a transgression that does not cause 
either physical or emotional suffering to another in some way and is still considered a moral 
issue. The kind of situations that can potentially induce moral outrage often feature the kind 
of victimization that may also trigger feelings of empathic anger. As these emotions can both 
be evoked by similar scenarios, both involve subjective feelings of anger, and both can 
prompt a wide range of both compassionate and aggressive behavior, it can be extremely 
difficult to clearly distinguish between the two and determine what their individual 
contributions to behavior may be. 
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Perhaps because of the difficulties in teasing it apart from moral outrage, empathic 
anger remains a largely under-studied moral emotion. Past work has focused primarily on 
establishing its links to specific behavioral motivations. Empathic anger has been previously 
linked to aggressive feelings towards transgressors, and a desire to punish them for their 
misdeeds (Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). It had also been found to predict a desire 
to assist the victimized individuals being considered (Skoe, Eisenberg, & Cumberland, 2002; 
Vitaglione & Barnett; 2003). However, several prominent gaps in the literature remain. For 
instance, past research looking at predictors of empathic anger has focused primarily on 
situational factors, such as characteristics of the victimized party (Batson et al., 2007; 
Hoffman, 2000). While situational factors no doubt play a considerable role in shaping 
emotional responses to moral violations, a number of individual characteristics may also 
contribute to the likelihood of experiencing empathic anger. Little attention has been given to 
how individual factors influence the likelihood that a given person will experience empathic 
anger in response to a situation, as opposed to feeling only empathic concern or moral 
outrage.  
Another gap in the literature involves the competing behavioral motivations empathic 
anger produces. Previous work on behavioral responses to empathic anger has focused on 
establishing causal links between empathic anger and both helping and punishing desires. 
While assisting a victim and punishing an aggressor are not mutually exclusive actions, they 
typically cannot be performed simultaneously. When experiencing empathic anger, 
individuals must decide which course of action to engage in first. It is currently unclear how 
individuals choose between conflicting desires to act prosocially towards victimized parties 
and to take punitive action against aggressors. 
Another noticeable gap in the current literature is the lack of developmental data 
regarding empathic anger. Previous studies have explored the situational triggers and 
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behavioral motivations of empathic anger in adult samples (Batson et al., 2007; Vitaglione & 
Barnett, 2003). Although some studies have touched on the occurrence of empathic anger in 
adolescents (Laible, Eye, & Carlo, 2008; Pozzoli, Gini, & Thornberg, 2017), findings 
regarding the effects of state empathic anger have not been clearly replicated in adolescent 
samples or younger age groups. Consequently, little is known about the developmental 
trajectory of this emotion. It is unclear whether empathic anger’s role as a predictor of both 
helping and punishing desires change over the course of development, or if the same trait-
level variables that predict empathic anger responses are also predictive in younger age 
groups.    
Individual Characteristics Predicting the Experience of Empathic Anger 
First and foremost, empathic anger cannot occur in the absence of empathy for a 
victimized individual. Individual differences in predispositions to empathize with others 
would presumably play a large role in determining whether an individual would react to a 
situation with feelings of empathic concern. Empathy can be defined as an affective state 
triggered by observing or imagining the affective state of another person, where an individual 
recognizes that the other person is the cause of their current emotional state (van Lange, 
2008). More broadly, Hoffman (1994) defined empathy as an “affective response that is more 
appropriate to the other’s situation than to one’s own.” Empathy is distinct from emotion 
matching, as emotion matching involves feeling the same emotion as another person, while 
empathy involves experiencing emotions of the same valence (i.e. positive or negative) as 
another person. For instance, an individual might observe another’s excitement and feel 
happy for them, or notice another person’s fear and experience pity for them (Batson & 
Ahmad, 2009). Empathy is also distinct from emotional contagion, in which an individual 
does not always recognize that another person is the source of their own emotional state (van 
Lange, 2008). Trait levels of empathy may thus be a major predictor in the likelihood of 
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experiencing empathic anger. Presumably, individuals with higher trait levels of empathy 
would experience both more frequent and more powerful sensations of empathic anger when 
confronted with the mistreatment or abuse of another person.  
Individual differences in perspective taking skills may also play a significant role in 
predicting the experience of empathic anger and the course of action individuals follow as a 
result of it. Positive links have been established between perspective taking and empathy, and 
it is widely accepted that being able to take on another person’s perspective makes it easier to 
empathize with them and engenders greater feelings of compassion towards them (Batson & 
Ahmad, 2009; Davis, 1983; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Individuals who are better 
able to take the perspectives of others are generally more likely to feel empathy for distressed 
others (Eisenberg et al., 1991). As a result, individuals high in trait levels of perspective 
taking would be more likely to empathize with injured parties, and may be more likely to 
experience empathic anger as a result. 
The likelihood of experiencing empathic anger may also be influenced by individual 
differences in anger-proneness. People differ in how likely they are to experience personal 
anger in response to potentially aggravating situations (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2007). 
Individuals who are more inclined to react to potential provocation with anger may be more 
likely to respond to the victimization of others with feelings of empathic anger, as opposed to 
experiencing only feelings of empathic concern.  
Predicting Behavioral Responses to Empathic Anger 
Empathic anger appears to motivate both prosocial and aggressive responses. A 
number of individual characteristics may influence which behavioral motivation is given 
higher priority and initially acted upon. Differences in trait empathy may not only influence 
the likelihood of experiencing empathic anger, but may also predict differences in how 
individuals choose to respond to the emotion. It is unclear whether individual differences in 
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trait empathy would predispose individuals to be more inclined to punish abusers or assist 
their victims following empathic anger.  High levels of trait empathy have been linked with a 
greater propensity for experiencing empathic concern about others and thus a greater 
willingness to help those in need (Batson, 1990; Carlo et al., 2012; Eisenberg, & Miller, 
1987). Past work has established that empathic concern and empathic anger make unique 
contributions to the desire to assist victimized individuals (Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). 
However, it is unclear if this link to stronger helping desires will also occur via empathic 
anger. Highly empathic individuals might feel empathy towards aggressors as well as their 
victims, which could dampen hostile feelings towards the aggressor.  
Stronger perspective taking skills have been linked to increased likelihood of 
engaging in prosocial behavior (Underwood & Moore, 1982). When individuals prone to 
perspective taking experience empathic anger, this may result in a greater emphasis on 
prosocial behavior, as they are better able to understand the victim’s needs and identify ways 
to assist them. Being able to take another person’s point of view has also been found to 
reduce the likelihood of responding to others’ potentially aggravating actions with anger 
(Mohr et al., 2007). In terms of empathic anger, this may lead individuals prone to 
perspective taking to be less inclined to punish aggressors, as they are more likely to 
understand the aggressor’s point of view and potentially feel some degree of compassion 
towards them. When trying to predict how individual differences in perspective taking would 
impact the behavioral motivations associated with empathic anger, it would be important to 
consider whose perspective observers are taking. Taking the victim’s perspective could 
strengthen either helping or punishing desires, whereas perspective taking that includes the 
aggressor would likely reduce aggressive desires towards them.  
In addition to individual trait-level variables, the experience of empathic anger might 
be influenced by the personal values an individual holds. While there is tremendous variation 
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in the moral beliefs and values people internalize, the moral principles an individual tends to 
emphasize most can be described at a general level as a moral orientation. Past work has 
identified two moral orientations that seem particularly relevant to the experience of empathic 
anger. The first, described as a care orientation, tends to place a large emphasis on assisting 
those in need (Simola, Barling, & Turner, 2010). Feelings of empathy play a large role in 
shaping how individuals with a care orientation respond to situations, and solutions to moral 
dilemmas tend to focus on the relationships of the people involved (Robertson, Snarey, 
Ousley, Harenski, & Bowman, 2007). Resolving moral dilemmas usually focuses on trying to 
find a way to satisfy the needs of as many of the people involved as possible (Simola, 
Barling, & Turner, 2010). Individuals characterized by a care orientation may be more 
inclined to focus on the compassionate feelings towards the victim produced by empathic 
anger. Their tendency to respond to moral issues by seeking to assist others and satisfy their 
needs may lead care oriented-individuals to either experience stronger helping motivations as 
a result of empathic anger, or to be more likely to act on the desire to help relative to 
punishing desires aimed at the aggressor. 
The second moral orientation that may be relevant to empathic anger is the justice 
orientation. Individuals characterized by justice orientations tend to focus on universal ethical 
principles, such as rights, obligations, rules, and ethical codes of conduct when faced with 
moral dilemmas (Robertson et al., 2007). Justice oriented individuals tend to place greater 
moral emphasis on the importance of fairness, reciprocity, impartiality, and not harming 
others (Robertson et al., 2007). When trying to resolve moral dilemmas, justice orientations 
are associated with focusing on arbitrating between conflicting rights and responsibilities. 
Justice oriented individuals tend to favor solutions that involve prioritizing the rights of one 
party over the other (Simola, Barling, & Turner, 2010). The tendency to emphasize the well-
being of one person over another may lead justice oriented individuals to be more willing to 
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act on the aggressive motivations produced by empathic anger, as they might be more willing 
to sacrifice the well-being of the aggressor in order defend the victim from further harm. 
Developmental Trajectory of Empathic Anger 
The developmental trajectory of empathy has been the subject of considerable 
research (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-
Yarrow, 1990; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992); however, little 
work has been done to map the development of empathic anger prior to adulthood. By age 
two, children display empathic concern for others (Hoffman, 2000), yet it remains unclear 
when we first develop the capacity to feel empathic anger in response to someone else’s 
mistreatment. Little research has been on empathic anger in children prior to adolescence, 
though there is scattered evidence of young children reacting aggressively to people and 
objects seen as responsible for upsetting their loved ones (e.g. Zahn-Waxler & Radke-
Yarrow, 1990). One study by Bang (2013) offered tentative evidence of empathic anger in a 
5th grader, who reacted with anger upon learning about the suffering of children during war 
and expressed a desire to “kill the war maker” responsible for the situation. However, it is 
unclear whether instances such as these reflect punitive desires stemming from empathic 
anger, moral outrage, or personal dislike for the target.  
The existing developmental work regarding empathic anger has focused largely on 
trait empathic anger among adolescents, particularly in regards to assisting or ignoring 
bullied peers. Work by Laible, Eye, and Carlo (2008) found that moral affect, including trait 
levels of empathic anger, was associated with greater self-reported prosocial behavior among 
adolescents aged 14 to 18, including a greater likelihood of intervening to defend peers who 
were being bullied. Recent work by Pozzoli, Gini, & Thornberg (2017) looked specifically at 
the relationships between trait empathic anger, perspective taking, empathic concern, and 
reactions to the victimization of peers during early adolescence. In a sample of Italian early 
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adolescents (Mage = 12 years), trait empathic anger positively predicted the self-reported 
likelihood of participants defending bullied peers. Trait empathic anger acted as a mediator of 
the links between perspective taking and empathic concern with defending behavior, in 
addition to making its own distinct contributions to assisting the victim. These studies offer 
support for the idea that experiencing empathic anger produces helping motivations among 
adolescents. It remains unclear whether empathic anger would also prompt retaliatory desires 
targeting the aggressor in adolescents as appears to be the case in adults. The current study 
hopes to extend these findings by exploring the predictive links between state empathic anger 
and both helping and punishing desires in adolescents. The study will also test these 
relationships in scenarios outside the school context that involve aggressive behaviors other 
than bullying. This will help to establish if adolescent responses to empathic anger are 
consistent across settings and types of aggression and ensure that factors specific to the 
school environment (e.g. zero-tolerance policies, reputational concerns) are not biasing 
participants towards helpful rather than aggressive behavior.  
Little work has been done on identifying the predictors of empathic anger reactions in 
adolescents. Some work has explored the links between parenting practices and levels of trait 
empathic anger. For example, research by Laible, Eye, and Carlo (2008) found that parental 
use of inductive discipline was associated with higher levels of moral affect, including trait 
empathic anger, among adolescents between the ages of 14 and 18. As with the adult 
literature, there appears to be a gap regarding the role of trait-level characteristics (beyond 
trait empathic anger) in predicting whether a situation evokes empathic anger in observers. 
Understanding how other trait-level variables and personal values influence the experience 
of, and reaction to, empathic anger in adolescence would offer insight into how adolescent 
individuals are likely to respond to this emotion across contexts. It may also provide insight 
into how to better evoke prosocial responses from adolescent bystanders and encourage 
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patterns of helping behavior in response to empathic anger as opposed to aggressive reactions 
which might endanger the observer or escalate the situation.  
There are also reasons to expect age-related differences in relationships between trait-
level variables and the behavioral motivations prompted by empathic anger. As discussed 
above, perspective taking abilities may play a significant role in predicting the experience of 
empathic anger. Between adolescence and adulthood, perspective taking skills improve, as 
individuals become better able to both consider the thoughts and emotions of others and the 
contexts they occur in (Cauffman, & Steinberg, 2000; Choudhury, Blakemore, & Charman, 
2006; Davis, & Franzoi, 1991). These changes may also contribute to reduced levels of 
victim blaming in adults compared to adolescents, as adults are better able to recognize how 
circumstances beyond the victims’ control contributed to their current distress. Adults may 
thus experience greater helping desires following empathic anger, as they are better able to 
appreciate the victims’ experiences and are less likely to engage in victim blaming than 
adolescents. 
Greater perspective taking abilities may also lead adults to experience higher levels of 
sympathy towards the aggressor compared to their adolescent peers. While both groups are 
expected to condemn the actions of aggressors and find them blame-worthy, adults may be 
better able to consider the aggressors’ point of view and feel some degree of sympathy for 
them while still recognizing that their actions were not acceptable. In addition to less 
developed perspective taking skills, adolescents typically have less emotional self-regulation 
than adults (Gestsdottir & Lerner, 2008; Steinberg, 2005; Steinberg et al. 2008). When 
confronted with the upsetting actions of aggressors, adolescents’ may not have the emotional 
regulation needed to look past their feelings of anger and distress in response to the 
aggressors’ actions in order to even attempt to consider the transgressors’ point of view. 
These differences may lead the two groups to experience different behavioral motivations in 
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response to empathic anger. Specifically, adults’ ability to potentially empathize with 
aggressors may cause them to experience reduced punishing desires in response to empathic 
anger compared to the punishing desires experienced by adolescents under similar 
circumstances.  
During mid-adolescence, individuals are still working to develop a clear sense of 
identity and self. This includes trying to determine what values are important to oneself and 
determining what strategies should be employed when faced with moral dilemmas or 
violations (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1966; Meeus, van de Shoot, Keijsers, Schwartz, & Branje, 
2010). By adulthood, individuals tend to have a clearer, more strongly internalized sense of 
their own values and beliefs. They have had time to develop consistent patterns in how they 
think about, and respond to, moral transgressions and questions of ethics. Based on these 
maturational changes, it seems reasonable to expect that adults would display higher levels of 
either care or justice orientations than adolescents, as their attitudes towards morality are 
more firmly established. If adults are more consistently committed to their moral orientation, 
scores on care and justice orientations in the adult sample may be more consistently linked 
with helping and punishing motivations compared to adolescents following empathic anger. 
Additionally, possessing a care orientation may have a stronger link to feelings of empathic 
anger among adults than among adolescents.  
The Effects of Victim Blaming 
When considering how individual characteristics and age may influence the 
experience of empathic anger and resulting behaviors, it is important to be aware of the 
potential effects of victim blaming. For empathic anger to occur, the observer needs to 
experience empathic concern for the victim’s plight. Thus, any factors reducing the likelihood 
of sympathy for the victim, such as victim blaming, would lead to reduced chances of 
experiencing empathic anger as well. Even in situations where victim blaming does not 
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appear justified based on available information, individuals may still be inclined to engage in 
victim blaming as a way to preserve their personal belief in a just world, where bad things 
happen only to those who deserve them (Hoffman, 2000). Feeling helpless to intervene or 
unable to assist another in need can also fuel victim blaming, as observers wish to alleviate 
the unpleasant feelings of concern and worry for the distressed party but are unable to do so 
through responsive action (Hoffman, 2000). By instead blaming the victim for their own 
misfortune, feelings of empathic concern can be muted (Hoffman, 2008). Presumably, victim 
blaming would undermine feelings of empathic anger in these circumstances as well. Victim 
blaming may also dampen desires to help victims when empathic anger does occur. If victims 
are deemed responsible for their own misfortunes, then less responsibility may be attributed 
to aggressors, reducing participants’ punishing motivations. For these reasons, measures of 
both victim blaming and aggressor blaming were included in the study. 
         Blame and anger often co-occur and blaming a target for a transgressor often 
produces anger towards them (Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995). Despite their close associations, 
blame and anger appear to be separable constructs. Blame involves an evaluative component, 
in which a target is deemed culpable for a certain outcome. Beyond personal responsibility 
for the event, considerations of intentionality, legitimacy, and severity of consequences also 
influence whether blame will be assigned to the target, with intentional, unjustified actions 
with more severe consequences typically being perceived as more blame-worthy (Shaver, 
1985; Weiner, 1995). Anger is an emotional reaction to aversive or aggravating events and 
circumstances, and can both influence the attribution of blame and be influenced by it 
(Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). The present study thus delineates between feelings of empathic 
anger, moral outrage, and blame directed towards aggressors and victims.  
The Current Study 
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     The current study had several goals. First, it aimed to explore potential roles of trait 
empathy, trait anger, trait perspective taking and care orientations as predictors of empathic 
anger in both an adolescent and an adult sample, while controlling for the effects of moral 
outrage. The study further sought to determine whether empathic anger significantly 
predicted helping and/or punishing desires in adults and adolescents when controlling for the 
contributions of moral outrage. Finally, the study intended to test the validity of new self-
report measures of empathic anger and moral outrage with both an adult and an adolescent 
sample. These measures were developed in the hopes of better discriminating between the 
effects of empathic anger and moral outrage than current self-report measures. 
The current study used a modified version of the design previously employed by 
Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) to study the effects of empathic anger on helping and 
punishing desires among an adult sample. In the present study, participants in both age 
groups listened to three audio recordings in which unfamiliar individuals describe their 
experiences being victimized by others. While Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) employed only 
a single audio segment, multiple stimuli were utilized in the current study to allow greater 
confidence that results did not reflect responses to unintended characteristics of a specific 
scenario. Participants in the current study then completed self-report measures of state 
empathic concern for the victim, state empathic concern for the aggressor, state victim 
blaming, state aggressor blaming, state empathic anger, state moral outrage, their desire to 
help the victim, and their desire to harm the aggressor responsible for the victim’s suffering. 
Principal factor analyses were used to determine if the empathic anger and moral outrage 
measures were capturing separate constructs. Hierarchical regression analyses were employed 
to determine if the variables of interest were significant predictors of empathic anger among 
adults and adolescents when controlling for demographic factors. Further hierarchical 
regressions were used to determine whether empathic anger was a significant predictor of 
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helping desires and punishing desires in adults and adolescents when controlling for the 
contributions of empathic concern, as well as demographic factors. 
Method 
Participants 
Data were collected from a total of 275 participants. 99 adults (55 male, 44 female) 
were recruited online via Amazon’s MechanicalTurk (MTurk) website. The adult sample was 
61.3% Asian/Pacific Islander, 22.5% Caucasian, 6.3% Native American, 5% African-
American, 2% Hispanic, and the remaining 2% identified as “other.” The adolescent sample 
consisted of 176 participants (81 male, 95 female), age 15 and 16, recruited via the Qualtrics 
Research Services and by contacting local summer camps directly. The adolescent sample 
was 61.1% Caucasian, 13.6% Asian/Pacific Islander, 10.5% Hispanic, 9.3% African-
American, 1.2% Native American, and 4.3% identified themselves as “other.” 
All participants completed the study online. Adults received $10 digital Amazon gift 
certificates as compensation. Adolescents recruited via Qualtrics were compensated $11 by 
the organization, and adolescents who were recruited from summer camps received $10 
digital Amazon gift certificates. 
Study Design 
Participants were told that the study aims to examine emotional responses to audio 
broadcasts of victims’ testimonies (this is similar to the cover story utilized by Vitaglione and 
Barnett (2003), in which participants were told the goal of the study was to gauge emotional 
reactions to radio broadcasts about social issues). After consenting to participate, participants 
provided demographic information regarding their gender and ethnicity. Participants listened 
to a series of recordings that were ostensibly of victims who were injured by others in various 
ways. The gender of the speaker was matched to the gender of the participant, in order to 
facilitate identification with the victim. Past work has found that people tend to empathize 
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more readily with unfamiliar individuals if they identify with them in some way, such as 
through shared characteristics like age or gender (Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Eisenberg, Fabes, 
& Spinrad, 2006). The aggressor in each scenario was also gender-matched to the participant. 
Additionally, victims and aggressors were age-matched with participants. This served to both 
further facilitate identification with victims, and to ensure there were no differences in 
response patterns caused by power imbalances from asking members of one age group to 
judge and respond to members of another (e.g. punishments inflicted on an adolescent by an 
adult may have been seen as harsher than those inflicted by a peer). 
Three scenarios were presented to participants in a randomized order. Scenario one 
described either a student who was bullied by a peer or an employee bullied by a co-worker, 
culminating in the aggressor deliberately causing the victim to fall and sustain severe injuries 
during sports practice. Scenario two featured a person who was struck by a drunk driver. This 
recording was a slightly modified version of the script employed by Vitaglione and Barnett 
(2003). Scenario three described a person who was mugged and struck over the head while 
returning home from a party. 
In all three scenarios, the victims described both physical injuries and mental anguish 
suffered as a result of the aggressor’s actions, in order to ensure the degree and type of harm 
was kept as close to equivalent as possible across scenarios. It was unclear whether the 
physical or mental anguish of a victim would be more likely to prompt empathic anger 
responses in observers. Both kinds of suffering were thus included in each scenario, in order 
to ensure the greatest likelihood of observing empathic anger reactions amongst participants. 
After each audio segment finished playing, participants were presented with an 
“Incident Information Sheet,” which provided additional information about the scenario they 
had just listened to. The purpose of these sheets wasto make it clear that the victims were not 
at fault for the incidents, to identify the aggressors, to make it clear that the aggressors were 
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not provoked in any way, to highlight the severity of the injuries suffered by the victims, and 
to ensure there was a clear target for feelings of empathic anger provoked by the audio 
segments. This helped to ensure that victim blaming did not reduce feelings of empathy for 
the victims. These sheets were modelled off the Broadcast Information Sheet employed by 
Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) for similar purposes. 
After reading the Incident Information Sheets, participants completed measures of 
state empathic concern for the victim, state empathic concern for the aggressor, state victim 
blaming, state aggressor blaming, state empathic anger, state moral outrage, questions asking 
which aspects of the scenario caused their feelings of anger, and a measure of helping and 
punishing desires. Once all audio segments had been heard and responded to, participants 
completed measures of trait empathy, trait perspective taking, trait empathic concern, trait 
moral outrage, care orientation, and justice orientation. 
The present study employed two empathic anger measures. One was previously 
employed by Vitaglione and Barnett (2003), and asked participants to rate how well eight 
adjectives described their current emotional state. Each word was an anger descriptor. While 
this measure has previously been employed to gauge empathic anger, feelings of moral 
outrage could also be captured by it, as the eight adjectives presented would be equally 
applicable to the subjective experience of empathic anger or moral outrage. In order to better 
distinguish between the impacts of empathic anger and moral outrage, two additional scales 
were composed. These scales asked participants to rate how well a series of statements 
describing feelings of anger stemming from a specific cause described their current emotional 
state. In the moral outrage measure, these statements described anger as stemming from the 
violation of moral rules and principles. In the statement-based empathic anger measure, 
statements described anger as being caused by the suffering and mistreatment of a victim. 
Measures 
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State Empathic Concern for Victim and Aggressor. State empathic concern for the 
victim and the aggressor were measured using five item questionnaires. The questionnaires 
ask participants to read five statements describing empathic feelings (compassion, sympathy, 
concern, care, and tender-heartedness) towards the victim of the audio segment and to rate 
how well each statement described their feelings towards the target using a Likert scale of 1 
(Not at all) to 5 (Very Well). Empathic concern for the aggressor was measured using the 
same scale, but participants were instructed to rate how well each word described their 
feelings towards the aggressor. Scores on each measure were the average rating of the five 
items, with higher scores indicating greater empathic concern for the target. The measure 
achieved Cronbachs’ alphas of .94 for both victims and aggressors in the present study. 
State Empathic Anger. Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) measured state empathic anger 
with a modified version of the Emotional Response Questionnaire (ERQ) (Batson, 1987), 
which included eight adjectives (mad, angry, furious, resentful, irritated, enraged, aggravated, 
outraged) as well as the adjectives used to measure state empathy (listed above). Vitaglione 
and Barnett (2003) established the validity and reliability of this additional subscale through a 
series of studies, and established that it produced a reliability of α = 0.95. In the current study, 
the measure achieved α = 0.92, α = 0.92, and α = 0.91 for the bullying, drunk driving, and 
mugging scenarios respectively. However, because this measure may fail to distinguish 
between empathic anger and moral outrage, the current study also employed a new measure 
intended to clearly differentiate these two emotions. This measure consisted of a face-valid, 
5-item Likert scale. Each item included an emotional descriptor that could apply to empathic 
anger, along with a reason for feeling the emotion that was based on suffering of the victim 
(e.g. “I am angry at [the Aggressor] for making [the Victim] suffer so much,” “I am furious at 
[the Aggressor] for how much pain they caused”). Participants were asked to rate how well 
each described their feelings in response to the audio segment on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 
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(Very Well). Scores were the average rating of the five items, with higher scores indicating 
greater feelings of empathic anger. The statement-based empathic anger measure achieved α 
= 0.92 for the bullying scenario, α = 0.93 for the drunk driving scenario, and α = 0.91 for the 
mugging scenario. 
State Moral Outrage. A five item questionnaire was composed as a tentative 
measure of state moral outrage. As in the newly composed state empathic anger measure, 
participants were asked to read five statements, and to rate how well each statement described 
their feelings in response to the audio segment on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all) to 
5 (Very Well). Each statement consisted of an anger descriptor compatible with feelings of 
moral outrage, along with a causal explanation based on the violation of moral rules or 
principles (e.g. “I am angry at [the Aggressor] for behaving in a way that is absolutely not 
allowed,” “I am furious at [the Aggressor] because they violated an important moral 
standard,” etc.)  Scores were the average rating of the five items, with higher scores 
indicating greater feelings of moral outrage. This measure of state moral outrage achieved α = 
0.91 for the bullying scenario, α = 0.89 for the drunk driving scenario, and α = 0.90 for the 
mugging scenario. 
State Victim and Aggressor Blaming. Participants completed two 5-item Likert 
scales designed to evaluate state victim blaming and state aggressor blaming. Each scale 
asked participants to rate how well five words (blame, dislike, anger, disapproval, 
condemnation) described their feelings towards either the victim or aggressor after listening 
to each audio segment. Words were rated on a Likert scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very Well). 
Separate scores for victim blaming and aggressor blaming were computed from the average 
of the five items on each scale, with higher scores indicating greater feelings of blame 
towards the target. The measure achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .97 for victim blaming and 
.92 for aggressor blaming in the present study. 
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Helping and Punishing Desires. Helping and punishing desires were measured via a 
modified version of the “Broadcast Response Sheet” employed by Vitaglione and Barnett 
(2003). Participants were given an “Incident Report Sheet” detailing five ways they might 
help the victim, as well as five ways in which they might retaliate against the aggressor, and 
were asked to rate how likely they would be to engage in each option on a scale of 1 (not 
likely at all) to 7 (very likely). Helping desires were calculated by averaging the rating of the 
five potential helping activities, with higher numbers indicating a greater desire to help. 
Likewise, punishing desires were calculated by averaging the ratings of the five potential 
punitive actions, with higher numbers indicating a greater desire to punish the aggressor. In 
the current study, the helping desire measure achieved α = 0.86 for the bullying scenario, α = 
0.88 for the drunk driving scenario, and α = 0.89 for the mugging scenario. The punishing 
desire measure achieved α = 0.88 for the bullying scenario, α = 0.91 for the drunk driving 
scenario, and α = 0.89 for the mugging scenario. 
Trait Empathy. Trait empathy was measured via Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright’s 
Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). This self-report measure is 
composed of 40 empathy measure questions, and 20 filler questions to distract participants 
from the measure’s focus on trait empathy. These filler questions were omitted from the 
current study for the sake of brevity. Each question was scored on a scale of 0 to 2, with 
higher total scores on the EQ indicating a greater propensity towards empathic responding. 
The measure achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .85 in the present study. 
Trait Perspective Taking. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index’s perspective taking 
subscale was used to evaluate participants’ trait perspective taking. Previous work has 
established the validity of the measure (e.g. Davis, 1983). The measure is scored by 
calculating the mean of the seven items answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5. 
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Higher scores were indicative of higher trait levels of perspective taking. The measure 
achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .74 in the present study.  
Trait Anger. Trait levels of anger-proneness were evaluated via the Trait anger 
subscale of the short form of the Early Adolescent Temperament Questionnaire- Revised. 
This anger-proneness subscale consists of seven self-report items, asking participants to rate 
how true a statement is of them on a Likert scale of 1 (“almost always untrue”) to 5 (“almost 
always true”). Scores were calculated by averaging responses to the seven items, with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of trait anger. This scale is suitable for use with adolescents 
aged 9 to 16 (Putnam, Ellis, & Rothbart, 2001). The wording of certain items was revised for 
the adult sample, in order to remain relevant to them (e.g. “[I] get very upset if I want to do 
something and my parents won't let me” was be changed to “[I] get very upset if I want to do 
something and other people won't let me”). The measure achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .74 
in the present study 
Care and Justice Orientations. Care and justice orientations were evaluated using 
the Worldview Questionnaire developed by Jensen, McGhie, & Jensen (1991). The measure 
is composed of 40 adjective pairs. In each pair, one adjective characterizes a care orientation 
while the other characterizes a justice orientation. Participants were forced to choose one 
adjective from each pair. Scores were calculated based on the total number of care oriented 
adjectives selected, with higher scores indicating greater care orientations and lower scores 
indicating greater justice orientation. The Worldview Questionnaire has demonstrated 
validity and reliability in previous research, and remains a reliable tool even when translated 
into other languages such as Dutch and Greek (e.g. Hornikx, Hendriks, & Thijzen, 2010; 
Jensen, McGhie, & Jensen, 1991; Karniol, Grosz, & Schorr, 2003; Stander & Jensen, 1993).  
The Worldview Questionnaire’s use of adjective selection in place of vignettes allowed both 
the adult and adolescent sample to complete the same measure, without the need to create 
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age-specific versions. In the present study, both the care and justice orientation portions of 
the scale achieved Cronbachs’ alphas of .71. 
Results 
Analysis Plan  
The data analyses began with four principal factor analyses and a confirmatory factor 
analysis. The first principal factor analysis was used to determine whether the statement-
based empathic anger measure, moral outrage measure, and adjective-based empathic anger 
measure loaded onto the anticipated factors. If the measures functioned as intended, the 
statement-based empathic anger measure and moral outrage measure would load onto two 
separate factors, indicating that they were tapping different underlying constructs. This would 
support the idea that they were successfully distinguishing between feelings of empathic 
anger and moral outrage. Given that the items in the adjective-based empathic anger measure 
could apply to either empathic anger or moral outrage, the factor analysis would also help to 
verify if this measure was indeed capturing empathic anger distinct from the effects of moral 
outrage. A confirmatory factor analysis was then performed on the items composing the 
statement-based empathic anger measure and the moral outrage measure, in order to verify 
whether the one or two-factor model was a better fit for the data and that the two-factor 
solution of the principal factor analysis was not the result of measurement artifacts. A second 
principal factor analysis was conducted to confirm that the statement-based empathic anger 
measure and moral outrage measure were not inadvertently capturing empathic concern for 
the victim.  A third principal factor analysis was performed in order to determine whether the 
adjective-based empathic anger measure, the statement-based empathic anger measure, the 
moral outrage measure, and the trait anger measure loaded onto separate factors. The goal of 
this analysis was to rule out the possibility that either of the empathic anger measures or the 
moral outrage measure might be capturing general anger-proneness, rather than the intended 
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emotions. Finally, a fourth principal factor analysis was conducted to determine if the 
adjective-based empathic anger measure, the statement-based empathic anger measure, the 
moral outrage measure, and the aggressor blaming measure loaded onto distinct factors. This 
analysis was intended to confirm that aggressor blaming was a separate construct from 
empathic anger and moral outrage, and that the three constructs weren’t all tapping the same 
underlying hostile feelings towards the aggressor. 
The next step of the data analyses was to employ repeated measures ANOVAs in 
order to determine if participant emotional responses to each of the audio segments were 
equivalent. If responses to the three scenarios did not diverge considerably, subsequent 
analyses could safely collapse across scenarios. Any lack of equivalency between audio 
segments could shed light on potential methodological issues that can then be avoided in 
subsequent work. 
Based on past work, gender and age differences were expected on a number of 
measures (Cauffman, & Steinberg, 2000; Eisenberg, & Lennon,1983; Eisenberg et al., 1991). 
One-way ANOVAs utilized to test for gender differences in responses to the audio segments 
as well as differences in trait-level variables. Similarly, one-way ANOVAs were employed to 
test for age differences in both state- and trait- level variables. 
Finally, a number of hierarchical linear regressions were used to test the causal 
relationships hypothesized to exist between the variables. The present study featured a large 
numbers of potential predictor variables under consideration, and it was expected that 
numerous predictors would interact with participant age. In order to keep the number of 
predictors in each hierarchical linear regression reasonable, hierarchical linear regressions 
were first run featuring one predictor variable at a time, alongside participant age and the 
interaction between age and the selected predictor variable. Gender was entered as a control 
in all of these regressions, as was ethnicity, which was recoded as a binary variable sorting 
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participants as either Caucasian or non-Caucasian. Predictors and interaction effects which 
proved significant in these initial regressions were then entered into another hierarchical 
linear regression together. Results of these combined regressions are reported below. 
Factor Analyses Distinguishing Empathic Anger from Moral Outrage and Empathic 
Concern for Victims 
The present study employed two empathic anger measures. However, scores on these 
two measures were highly correlated (r = .90, p < .001). Scores on the original, adjective-
based empathic anger measure also correlated highly with scores on both the statement-based 
empathic anger measure (r = .70, p < .001) and the moral outrage measure (r = .67, p < .001), 
raising the possibility that the measures may not be capturing distinctive constructs. 
To address this possibility, a principal factor analysis was performed on the items 
composing each of the three measures (five items in the moral outrage measures, five items in 
the statement-based empathic anger measure, and eight items in the adjective-based empathic 
anger measure).  These items produced a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling adequacy of .95, 
which was deemed acceptable as it was above the recommended value of .60. Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity produced a significant result (χ2 (153) = 5056.59). Varimax rotation was used. 
The rotated factor matrix produced a two-factor solution. The moral outrage and 
statement-based empathic anger measure loaded on a single factor (factor 1), while the 
adjective-based empathic anger measure loaded on another factor (factor 2) (see Table 1). A 
confirmatory factor analysis was then performed to confirm that a one factor solution for the 
statement-based empathic anger measure and the moral outrage measure was a better fit for 
the data than a two-factor solution. The confirmatory factor analysis was conducted in MPlus, 
and included the 5 items of the statement-based empathic anger measure and the 5 items of 
the moral outrage measure. A significant change in χ2 was obtained when comparing the two-
factor model to the one factor model (delta χ2(1) = 42.07, p < .001), indicating the one factor 
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solution was a better fit. The one factor model produced an RMSEA value of 0.10, and a CFI 
value of 0.94 (factor loadings and additional fit indices for both models can be found in Table 
2). Based on these results, it appears that the moral outrage and statement-based empathic 
anger measures are capturing the same construct, which has been tentatively identified as 
empathic anger. Theoretical justifications for this label are described in the discussion section 
below. In the following analyses, empathic anger is operationalized as participant scores on 
the statement-based empathic anger measure. 
A second principal factor analysis was conducted to ensure that the statement-based 
empathic anger measure and the moral outrage measure were not inadvertently capturing the 
effects of empathic concern for the victims. All five items of the empathic concern for the 
victim measure were included, along with the five items of the moral outrage measure, the 
five items of the statement-based empathic anger measure, and the eight items of the 
adjective-based empathic anger measure. These items produced a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
sampling adequacy of .95. Bartlett’s test of sphericity produced a significant result (χ2 (253) = 
6421.35). Varimax rotation was utilized. 
The rotated factor matrix produced a three-factor solution. As in the previous 
principal factor analysis, the moral outrage and statement-based empathic anger measure 
loaded on a single factor and the adjective-based empathic anger measure loaded onto a 
second factor. All items measuring empathic concern for the victim loaded exclusively onto a 
third factor (see Table 3). Two items from the moral outrage measure and two items from the 
statement-based empathic anger measure also loaded weakly onto this factor (loadings of .41 
to .42), but these items loaded more strongly onto the second factor (loadings of .58 to .74). 
Thus, it appears that the moral outrage measure, the statement-based empathic anger 
measure, and the adjective-based empathic anger measure are capturing constructs distinct 
from empathic concern for victims. 
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         A third principal factor analysis was performed to confirm that the statement-based 
empathic anger measure, the adjective-based empathic anger measure, and the moral outrage 
measure were not capturing general anger-proneness. This analysis included the seven items 
of the trait anger scale, along with the five items of the moral outrage measure, the five items 
of the statement-based empathic anger measure, and the eight items of the adjective-based 
empathic anger measure. These items produced a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling adequacy of 
.94. Bartlett’s test of sphericity produced a significant result (χ2 (300) = 5500.39). Varimax 
rotation was employed. 
         The rotated factor matrix produced a 4-factor solution. Once again, the moral outrage 
and statement-based empathic anger measure loaded on a single factor, with the adjective-
based empathic anger measure loaded onto an additional factor. The items of the trait anger 
measure loaded onto the third and fourth factors exclusively (see Table 4). While it would be 
preferable for all the trait anger items to have loaded on the same factor, the results indicate 
that both empathic anger measures and the moral outrage measure are not simply capturing a 
general predisposition towards anger.  
 A fourth and final principal factor analysis was performed to confirm that the 
statement-based empathic anger measure, the adjective-based empathic anger measure, the 
moral outrage measure, and the aggressor blaming measure reflected distinct constructs and 
not a broader moral construct of moral condemnation, and that blame felt towards the 
aggressor was not being inadvertently captured by the empathic anger or moral outrage 
measures. This analysis included the five items of the moral outrage measure, the five items 
of the statement-based empathic anger measure, the eight items of the adjective-based 
empathic anger measure, and the five items of the aggressor blaming measure. These items 
produced a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling adequacy of .95. Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
produced a significant result (χ2 (153) = 5056.59). Varimax rotation was employed. 
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 The rotated factor matrix produced a three-factor solution. As in the previous 
principal factor analyses, the statement-based empathic anger measure and the moral outrage 
measure loaded onto a single factor. Once again, the adjective-based empathic anger measure 
loaded onto a second factor. The items of the aggressor blaming measure loaded onto a third 
factor (see Table 5). This supports the interpretation that the angry emotional responses 
captured by the statement-based empathic anger measure and the moral outrage measure are 
distinct from the feelings of blame felt towards the aggressor. 
Testing Equivalency Between Scenarios 
Participants in both age groups listened to gender-matched speakers describe three 
scenarios intended to evoke feelings of empathic anger on behalf of victims. These scenarios 
involved bullying in either school or the workplace, a drunk driver striking a pedestrian, and 
a mugging. A series of repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to determine if 
emotional responses to the three scenarios were equivalent. Some significant differences in 
state emotional scores following the scenarios did emerge when comparing reactions to the 
drunk driving and mugging scenarios (see Table 6). After listening to the mugging scenario, 
participants reported significantly higher levels of empathic anger, punishing desires, and 
aggressor blaming compared to the drunk driving scenario. Empathic concern for the 
aggressor was higher following the drunk driving scenario compared to the mugging 
segment. Responses to the bullying scenario did not differ significantly compared to the other 
audio clips. A trend towards significantly higher aggressor blaming scores following the 
mugging scenario compared to the bullying scenario emerged, though it failed to achieve 
significance (p = 0.052). Given the minor nature of these differences, subsequent analyses 
collapsed across audio segments, using averaged scores of state emotional responses. 
Descriptive Data and Bivariate Relations 
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A summary of the descriptive statistics can be found in Table 6. Bivariate relations 
between the variables of interest can be found in Table 8.  
Several significant gender differences were evident in the data among both trait and 
state measures (see Table 9). A series of one-way ANOVA’s were employed to test for 
significance. There were significant gender differences in measures of trait empathy, trait 
perspective taking and care orientation. Gender differences were also observed on the 
measure of justice orientation. In terms of state emotional responses following the audio 
segments, significant gender differences emerged, with females scoring higher than males on 
measures of empathic anger, state empathic concern for victims, helping desires, and 
aggressor blaming. Males scored higher than their female peers on measures of empathic 
concern for aggressors, punishing desires, and victim blaming. Gender was thus treated as a 
control variable in subsequent analyses. 
         One-way ANOVAs were also employed to determine whether or not differences in 
the mean scores of adults and adolescents were significant. It was originally hypothesized 
that adults would display significantly higher levels of trait perspective taking compared to 
adolescents, as well as higher scores on measures of both justice and care orientations. Adults 
were also anticipated to score higher on measures of empathic concern for aggressors. 
Adolescents were expected to report higher levels of victim-blaming. Of these anticipated 
differences, only victim blaming differed significantly between age groups (p = .043). 
Counter to expectations, adults actually displayed higher mean levels of victim blaming than 
did adolescents (Madult = 1.83, Madolescent = 1.59). 
Hierarchical Linear Regression Models 
Feelings of empathic anger following the audio segments were expected to be 
positively predicted by trait levels of empathy, trait levels of anger, care orientation, and 
perspective taking skills, and negatively predicted by victim blaming, particularly among 
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adolescents. A hierarchical linear regression controlling for the effects of age, gender, and 
ethnicity found that, of these anticipated predictors, only trait anger, trait perspective taking, 
and victim blaming proved significant. Higher levels of victim blaming predicted lower 
levels of empathic anger (β = -.39, p < .001). Higher levels of trait anger also predicted higher 
levels of reported empathic anger (β = .23, p < .001). Higher levels of trait perspective taking 
also predicted greater levels of empathic anger in response to the audio segments (β = .16, p < 
.001)1. No age effect was present, nor did age significantly interact with any other predictor 
of empathic anger. There were no significant interaction effects involving participant gender 
or ethnicity either (see Table 10). 
 It was anticipated that helping desires would be positively predicted by feelings of 
empathic anger, empathic concern for the victim, and a care orientation, and negatively 
predicted by victim blaming. A hierarchical linear regression controlling for the effects of 
age, gender, and ethnicity was conducted. Higher levels of empathic anger positively 
predicted helping desires (β = .21, p < .01). Empathic concern for the victim of a scenario 
also positively predicted participants’ desire to help (β = .51, p < .01). Care orientation also 
proved to be a significant positive predictor of helping desires (β = .12, p = .03). As expected, 
higher levels of victim blaming significantly predicted reduced helping desires (β = -.37, p = 
.05). However, there was also a significant age by victim blaming interaction effect (β = .57, 
p = .02), which revealed that victim blaming was only a significant negative predictor of 
helping desires for adolescents. Among adult participants, victim blaming failed to achieve 
significance as a predictor of helping desires. A significant effect of gender was also 
                                                
1 When both trait empathy and trait perspective taking were included in the same regression model, 
neither achieved significance. Trait empathy remained non-significant when trait perspective taking 
was omitted. However, when trait empathy was omitted from the regression, trait perspective taking 
achieved significance as a predictor of empathic anger. This is likely due at least in part to the 
significant correlation between trait empathy and trait perspective taking (r = .42, p < .001). It thus 
appears that the trait empathy measure may be washing out the effects of the trait perspective taking 
measures, possibly due to the similarity of the constructs being tapped by each scale (e.g. Davis,  
1983). 
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observed (β = .14, p < .01), such that females reported significantly higher helping desires 
than did their male peers (see Table 10). 
Punishing desires were expected to be positively predicted by feelings of empathic 
anger, moral outrage and aggressor blaming. A justice orientation was also expected to 
positively predict punishing desires, while empathic concern for the aggressor was expected 
to negatively predict punishing desires, particularly among adults. A hierarchical linear 
regression controlling for the effects of age, gender, and ethnicity determined that of these 
predictors, there were only significant effects of state empathic anger, gender, ethnicity, and 
an age x ethnicity interaction. Higher levels of state empathic anger predicted greater 
punishing desires among participants (β = .44, p = .02). Gender significantly predicted 
punishing desires (β = -.13, p = .03), such that male participants reported higher punishing 
desires than did their female peers. Whether participants were Caucasian or a member of an 
ethnic minority was also a significant predictor (β = -.45, p = .02), such that non-white 
participants reported significantly higher levels of punishing desires than did Caucasian 
participants. There was also a significant interaction between age and ethnic status (β = 1.14, 
p = .001; see Table 10), such that among Caucasian participants, adolescents reported higher 
punishing desires than adults (Madolescent = 2.93, Madult = 2.11), whereas among non-Caucasian 
individuals, adults endorsed higher punishment desires than adolescents (Madolescent = 2.99, 
Madult = 3.99). One-way ANOVAs were used to confirm that these age differences in 
punishing desires were significant for both Caucasian and non-Caucasian participants. 
Discussion 
Empathic Anger and Moral Outrage Measures 
Based on the results of a principal factor analysis, it appears that the adjective-based 
empathic anger measure is tapping a different construct than the statement-based empathic 
anger and moral outrage measures. Confirmatory factor analysis further suggests that the 
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statement-based empathic anger measure and the moral outrage measure are tapping the same 
construct. If moral outrage and empathic anger are distinct emotions, then it may be the case 
that the statement-based empathic anger measure and the moral outrage measure are both 
tapping feelings of empathic anger.     
The items rated by participants in the adjective-based empathic anger measure are 
generic anger words. Although intended to tap feelings of empathic anger, these descriptors 
could be equally applicable to feelings of moral outrage. The items presented in the moral 
outrage measure include not only anger descriptors but specify the reasons why these 
emotions are being experienced. These reasons clearly identified the violation of moral rules 
and principles as the cause of anger and made no mention of the victim or their suffering. 
These causal explanations were intended to make the items exclusively compatible with 
moral outrage, as feelings of empathic anger would be rooted in concerns for the victim’s 
wellbeing. However, participants may have been basing their decisions of whether an action 
violated important moral principles on whether the act caused harm to a victim. Concerns 
with causing harm to others are commonly cited as justifications for why an act should be 
forbidden or condemned (Graham et al., 2012), with more damaging acts typically seen as 
more severe moral violations (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). Thus, the degree to 
which a victim was perceived to be suffering may have impacted the degree to which 
participants felt a moral rule had been broken. This may have caused the statement-based 
empathic anger measure and the moral outrage measure to both capture the experience of 
empathic anger. 
It is also possible that the statement-based empathic anger measure was capturing 
feelings of moral outrage. However, this interpretation seems less likely. The statement-based 
empathic anger measure specified that feelings of anger resulted from the suffering of the 
victim. While actions may be deemed forbidden or contrary to moral standards because of the 
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harm they cause victims, it seems less likely that victims would be experiencing suffering 
because the aggressor’s actions contracted established rules or principles. 
If the anger participants’ feel in response to moral principles being violated stems 
primarily from the harm these transgressions cause to a victim, it may be the case that there is 
no clear distinction between empathic anger and moral outrage in situations where one party 
is victimized. While making the injured party sympathetic may strengthen empathic anger 
felt on their behalf, it is possible that anger felt in response to moral violations towards even 
unsympathetic targets is rooted in the knowledge that a party has been unjustly harmed. 
Whether an act is considered to be a moral transgression often hinges on whether it causes 
harm to another or has the potential to do so (Graham et al., 2011). Graham et al (2011) 
identified four domains of moral concern in addition to causing and preventing personal 
harm, including issues of loyalty, fairness/reciprocity, respect for authority, and concerns of 
purity/sanctity. Yet violations of these domains could still be interpreted as causing some 
kind of harm to others (e.g. threatening the well-being of group members with disloyal 
behavior, harming others through unfair treatment, damaging the reputation of superiors by 
disregarding authority, contaminating others with impure behavior, etc.). Violating moral 
rules perceived as having been set down by a divine authority could similarly be interpreted 
as potential harmful, either due to fear of divine retribution, or due to causing harm or distress 
to the deity itself. In order to determine if moral outrage exists as a separate emotion from 
empathic anger, researchers may need to employ moral transgressions that do not have the 
potential to victimize others and contrast the emotional reactions these scenarios evoke with 
responses to situations in which a target is unjustly harmed without the violation of a moral 
rule.  
It remains unclear what is being captured by the second factor that the adjective-based 
empathic anger measure loaded onto. The items of the adjective-based measure loaded onto 
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different factors than the items composing the trait anger measure, suggesting that the generic 
anger terms used in the adjective-measure are not simply capturing anger proneness. 
Additionally, the items of the adjective-based measure loaded onto a separate factor than the 
items of the aggressor blaming measure, indicating that the adjective-based measure was not 
capturing accusatory feelings directed towards the moral violator. While it is possible that the 
adjective-based measure captured feelings of moral outrage, it may have also been capturing 
other hostile or anger-based emotions. Given the ambiguity of the construct being tapped, the 
adjective-based measure was omitted from subsequent analysis.  
Lack of Equivalency Between Scenarios 
Overall, participants in both age groups appeared to have the greatest negative 
reaction the mugging scenario, and to report the least negative emotion to the drunk driving 
scenario. Emotional responses to the bullying scenario fell somewhere in between the other 
two. These differences persisted across genders and age groups, suggesting the differences 
did not stem from the quality of the speaker reading each script, and instead stemmed from 
characteristics of the situation being described. 
Participants may have taken a more lenient stance towards the drunk driver (i.e. 
reporting lower levels of aggressor blaming and higher levels of empathic concern for the 
aggressor) due to the accidental nature of the situation. The incident information sheet 
provided to participants made it clear that the driver had made a deliberate choice to drive 
while dangerously intoxicated, thus disregarding the safety of others on the road. However, 
the driver had not set out with the specific intention of injuring others, whereas the harm 
inflicted in both the bullying and mugging scenarios was deliberate. The driver was also 
heavily intoxicated, and participants may have been more forgiving of the driver’s actions, 
including the decision to drive, given this cognitive impairment (Cushman, 2008).  
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The mugging scenario appeared to prompt the strongest negative reaction from 
participants. Unlike the bullying or drunk driving scenarios, the mugging scenario included 
the theft of personal items from the victim in additional to causing physical and emotional 
harm. The mugging scenario may have been regarded as a more severe moral transgression 
than the bullying scenario due to its illegal nature. While the drunk driving scenario also 
describes illegal activity, the mugging scenario features intentional harm as opposed to the 
accidental harm caused by the drunk driver. These factors may have contributed to the 
stronger negative reaction to the mugging scenario compared to the drunk driver and bullying 
scenarios. 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Regression Analyses 
Of the hypothesized predictors of empathic anger responses, only victim blaming and 
trait anger proved to be significant. As expected, there was a negative relationship between 
victim blaming and empathic anger, with higher levels of victim blaming predicting reduced 
feelings of empathic anger. Based on past work (e.g. Hoffman, 2008), it is likely that blaming 
victims for bringing about their own suffering and misfortune reduces empathic feelings 
towards them, making the experience of empathic anger on their behalf less likely.  
Interestingly, trait levels of empathy did not significantly predict empathic anger. This 
seems counter-intuitive, given the fundamental role empathic concern for victims is believed 
to play in triggering feelings of empathic anger. At the trait level, only trait anger and trait 
perspective taking emerged as significant positive predictors of empathic anger. These results 
suggest that that individual differences in anger-proneness may be better predictors of 
empathic anger responding than individual differences empathic involvement in victims’ 
plights. Rather than thinking of empathic anger and empathic concern as two emotions that 
occur simultaneously and totally independent of each other, it may be better to conceptualize 
empathic anger as a response that can emerge from existing feelings of empathic concern. 
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While trait empathy playa an important role in determining if empathic concern is felt for a 
target initially, they may not exert much influence on whether or not these feelings give rise 
to an empathic anger response. Future research on empathic anger may wish to focus on 
teasing apart these two possible explanations for the emotion. Additionally, research aimed at 
identifying trait-level predictors of empathic anger may wish to focus on the angry, hostile 
components of the emotion rather than the compassionate and empathetic aspects. 
Trait empathy’s failure to achieve significance as a predictor of empathic anger 
reactions also raises the question of whether empathy is truly playing a role in driving the 
anger captured by the statement-based measure. If trait empathy does not predict the angry 
sentiments reported by participants, it may be misleading to refer to this response as 
“empathic anger,” as it may reflect sentiments closer to moral outrage after all. However, 
while trait empathy failed to achieve significance as a predictor of angry feelings in response 
to the audio stimuli, trait perspective taking did positively predict anger responses. This 
suggests that emotional involvement in the victim’s plight does play a role in producing the 
feelings of anger experienced by participants. This predictive relationship appears more 
consistent with empathic anger than moral outrage, which would not depend on concern or 
emotional involvement with the victim. The trait empathy measure employed by the present 
is a relatively general measure of the construct and does not divide trait empathy into sub-
categories as some measures have. For instance, Davis’ (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
divided trait empathy into four sub-scales of perspective taking, fantasy, empathic concern, 
and personal distress. It may be the case that specific sub-categories of trait empathy, such as 
perspective taking and empathic concern, are important for the experience of empathic anger, 
and their effects were muted in the present study as the irrelevant sub-categories were also 
captured by the present trait empathy measure. This interpretation appears consistent with the 
fact that trait perspective taking achieved significance as a predictor of empathic anger in the 
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present study. Future work may wish to explore the predictive relationships between more 
fine-grained categorizations of trait empathy and empathic anger to better understand the role 
of empathic dispositions in triggering anger responses.  
Surprisingly, age did not achieve significance as a predictor of empathic anger, nor 
did it produce significant interaction effects with any other predictor of empathic anger. This 
suggests that the relationships between the predictor variables and empathic anger might not 
undergo significant change or alteration between mid-adolescence and adulthood. This offers 
tentative evidence suggesting that trait-level factors shaping the experience of empathic anger 
may be in place by the mid-teens. Subsequent research could expand on this finding by 
examining individual stability in empathic anger responding from mid-adolescence to 
adulthood, thus confirming developmental stability of empathic anger predictors across this 
time period. Although trait empathy and perspective taking failed to achieve significance 
with the current samples, it may be worthwhile to test for predictive effects on empathic 
anger in younger age groups. Among young children who are still developing these abilities, 
individuals more inclined to empathize with others and take their perspectives may be more 
capable of experiencing empathic anger than age-matched peers who are less empathic or less 
inclined to consider others’ perspectives. 
         Previous work has identified empathic anger as a significant contributor to helping 
desires, distinct from the motivational contributions made by empathic concern (Skoe, 
Eisenberg, & Cumberland, 2002; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). The present study replicated 
these findings in an adult sample and extended them to an adolescent sample. No significant 
main effects of age on helping desires were observed, nor was there a significant interaction 
effect between age and empathic anger in regards to helping desires. These results suggest 
empathic anger predicts the same outcomes in mid-adolescents and adults. It may be the case 
that empathic anger responses have fully matured by mid-adolescence, being triggered by the 
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same emotions and producing the same behavioral motivations during mid-adolescence and 
adulthood. Subsequent research could extend this work with longitudinal methods, and by 
exploring potential links between empathic anger and helping desires in even younger age 
groups. 
         Although age did not produce a significant main effect on helping desires, it is worth 
noting that it did interact significantly with the effects of victim blaming. As expected, higher 
levels of victim blaming significantly predicted lower levels of helping desires. This effect 
appears to be driven by an age x victim blaming effect, such that victim blaming only 
significantly predicts reduced helping motivations among adolescents. Victim blaming failed 
to produce significant effects on the helping motivations of adults, despite adolescents 
reporting significantly lower levels of victim blaming than did their adult peers (p = .043). It 
may be the case that, while adults are more inclined to engage in victim blaming, this blame 
is less likely to create indifference to the victim’s suffering among adults or to make adults 
feel absolved of the obligation to assist those in need. Future work may wish to explore why 
the effects of victim blaming on helping desires differed between these two age groups.   
 Punishing desires were significantly predicted by feelings of empathic anger in the 
present study, consistent with previous work finding a predictive link between these factors 
(Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003), though only when 
aggressor blaming was omitted from the regression analysis. Aggressor blaming and state 
empathic anger were highly correlated in the present sample (r = .73, p < .001), although 
principle factor analysis and the existing literature suggests they are separate constructs. This 
strong correlation likely contributed to aggressor blaming washing out the effects of state 
empathic anger on punishing desires.  
Additionally, punishing desires in the present study were low overall (M = 3.16 on a 
7-point scale). The nature of the punishment options and the scenarios presented to 
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participants may have contributed to these reduced punishing desires, and thus weakened the 
perceived link between empathic anger and the desire to punish transgressors. The drunk 
driving and mugging scenarios involved illegal activities which would presumably lead to 
police involvement and legal repercussions for the aggressor. In the case of the bullying 
scenario, participants might have inferred that the school/company responsible for organizing 
the soccer game would take action against the aggressor. Participants may have thus been less 
inclined to punish aggressors, as they assumed other punishments would occur irrelevant of 
their own actions. The punishment options presented to participants were also fairly indirect 
ways of retaliating against the aggressor. Given the severity of the transgressions described, 
participants may not have found these comparatively mild forms of punishment appealing. If 
more severe forms of retaliation had been available, and punishment by other agents had not 
been implied by the scenarios, participants might have reported higher punishing desires and 
a significant relationship between the experience of empathic anger and punishing 
motivations may have emerged.     
It may also be the case that the feelings of empathic anger towards the perceived 
transgressor do not lead to punishing desires the way feelings of personal anger do. Empathic 
anger’s unique components of empathic concern for the victim’s well-being may prompt 
strong helping desires not present in other experiences of anger. These helping desires may 
distract from or dampen the punishing motivations that typically coincide with moral blame. 
It is also worth noting that the present study only measured participants’ helping and 
punishing desires immediately after learning of the victims’ mistreatment. It is possible that 
the motivational effects of empathic anger may be time-sensitive, with helping desires 
focused on the victim occurring immediately, and punishing desires focusing on the 
transgressor occurring later. This kind of delay in punishing motivations could be adaptive in 
ensuring injured parties receive immediate aide in critical situations. Once victims’ safety has 
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been re-established, focus can shift to seeking retribution against the guilty party. It may also 
be the case that rather than being time-sensitive per say, punishing desires are only prompted 
by empathic anger once the victim’s well-being has been verified in some way. If the audio 
segments had described victims as already receiving help and support from others, 
participants’ empathic anger may have resulted in punishing desires targeting the aggressor 
instead of helping desires aimed at the already well-cared for victims. Future research may 
want to explore how the timing of measures and differences in victim’s immediate need 
influence the link between empathic anger and punishing desires. 
          Participant age did not produce significant effects on punishing desires or the link 
between empathic anger and desires to punish transgressors. However, a significant age by 
ethnicity effect did emerged, with Caucasian adolescents exhibiting higher punishing desires 
than adults. Among non-Caucasian individuals, this pattern was reversed, with adults 
experiencing higher punishment desires than adolescents. This interaction between age and 
ethnicity regarding punishing desires may reflect cultural differences in how attitudes 
regarding punishment and retribution change from adolescence into adulthood. Combined 
with the lack of an interaction between age and empathic anger on helping desires, the 
findings of this study suggest that empathic anger produces similar behavioral motivations in 
adults and adolescents. This work could be expanded upon by determining if situational 
factors influencing responses to empathic anger have comparable effects on adults and 
adolescents. The relationship between empathic anger and punishing desires could be tested 
in younger age groups in order to extend our understanding of the developmental trajectory of 
this emotion and its resulting behavioral motivations.  
  
Limitations 
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Unfortunately, principal factor analysis found that the moral outrage measure 
composed for this study did not differentiate the effects of moral outrage and empathic anger. 
The adjective-based empathic anger measure may have been tapping moral outrage but given 
the broad nature of the anger-descriptors used in the scale, it could not confidently be said to 
reflect only this emotion. The present study was thus unable to quantify the impacts of moral 
outrage and include this emotion as a control variable in the hierarchical linear regression 
analyses. It is possible that some of the predictive effects attributed to empathic anger may 
instead reflect the contributions of moral outrage. Future research would benefit from the 
development of a measure capable of clearly differentiating between the experience of 
empathic anger and moral outrage, thus allowing the effects of each emotion on behavioral 
motivations to be disentangled. 
Order of State and Trait Measures 
 All participants responded to the three audio segments and completed measures of 
their emotional states prior to completing the trait measures at the end of the study. The 
measures were organized this way in order to prevent self-perceptions triggered by the trait 
measures from influencing how participants responded to the state emotion measures. 
However, it is possible that completing the state emotion scales may have impacted how 
participants answered the trait questionnaires. In particular, feelings of empathic anger or 
moral outrage triggered by the audio stimuli may have caused participants to rate themselves 
more highly on the measure of trait anger. If this is the case, it may have contributed to trait 
anger emerging as a significant predictor of empathic anger while trait empathy and trait 
perspective taking did not. Future work could avoid this issue by counter-balancing the order 
in which participants complete the state and trait measures, or by having participants 
complete trait measures at a different date than the main body of the study. 
Ethnicity of Adult and Adolescent Samples  
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The adult and adolescent samples differed in their ethnic makeup, with the majority of 
adolescent participants identifying as Caucasian while the majority of adults described 
themselves as Asian. These differences likely stemmed from the adults being recruited via 
MTurk, whereas the adolescents were recruited with assistance from Qualtrics. Additionally, 
while the adolescent sample was exclusively recruited from the United States, the MTurk 
sample may have included participants from other countries. Thus, participants identifying 
themselves as Asian in the adolescent and adult samples may not be comparable, due to their 
different cultural backgrounds. Given that ethnicity emerged as a significant predictor of 
punishing desires in the adult sample, more similarity in the ethnic makeup of the two age 
groups might have added to the informativeness of the study findings. In the future, stricter 
inclusion criteria for MTurk participants could be enforced in order to ensure greater 
comparability between age groups. 
 
 
  
Conclusions 
The current results suggest that, at the trait-level, anger-proneness and related 
characteristics may be better predictors of empathic anger than individual differences in trait 
empathy and perspective taking. In both age groups, empathic anger made significant 
contributions to helping desires when controlling for the contributions of empathic concern 
for victims. Although empathic anger has previously been established as a predictor of 
punishing desires, this link did not emerge among either adults or adolescents in the current 
study. This highlights the need to develop distinct measures of empathic anger and moral 
outrage which can reliably distinguish between these two emotions and their contributions to 
behavioral motivations.  
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Adults and adolescents displayed similar links between trait-level predictors of 
empathic anger, as well as between empathic anger and helping and punishing desires. These 
findings offer tentative evidence that empathic anger’s links to the trait-level variables 
considered here, as well as its resulting behavioral motivations, have matured by mid-
adolescence. Future work can further extend the developmental trajectory of empathic anger 
by examining its trait-level predictors and effects on behavioral motivations in younger age 
groups. 
The present study also raises questions about the distinctions between empathic anger 
and moral outrage. It may be the case that the two emotions are not separable constructs, at 
least in cases where a clear victim is present. Further work is needed to expand on this 
possibility, both by looking at anger reactions in response to victimless crimes and by 
continuing efforts to develop measurement tools that can distinguish between empathic anger 
and moral outrage if they are in fact distinct emotions. 
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Table 1 
Factor Loadings Based on Principal Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation for Items of the 
Statement-Based Empathic Anger, Adjective-Based Empathic Anger, and Moral Outrage 
Measures 
 
 Empathic Anger Anger/Hostility 
I am angry at [the Aggressor] for behaving 
in a way that is absolutely not allowed. 
 
.85  
I am furious at [the Aggressor] because 
they violated an important  
moral standard. 
 
.83  
I am outraged at [the Aggressor] for 
breaking the rules. 
 
.76  
I am mad at [the Aggressor] because their 
behavior was unacceptable. 
 
.71  
[The Aggressor] enraged me by violating 
important principles. 
 
.79 .40 
I am angry at [the Aggressor] for making 
[the Victim] suffer so much. 
 
.83  
I am furious at [the Aggressor] for how 
much pain they caused. 
 
.83 .41 
I am mad at [the Aggressor] because of the 
agony they caused for [the Victim]. 
 
.79  
I am outraged with [the Aggressor] because 
of how they made [the Victim] feel. 
 
.81  
[The Aggressor] enraged me by causing 
[the Victim] so much anguish. 
 
.80 .45 
Mad  .72 
Angry  .83 
Furious  .86 
Resentful 
 
 .68 
Irritated  .66 
Enraged  .84 
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Aggravated  .80 
Outraged  .78 
Note. Factor loadings < .4 are suppressed. 
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Table 2 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for the Items of the Empathic Anger (Statement-Based) 
and Moral Outrage Measures 
 
 
 χ 2 df χ 2 diff ∆df CFI RMSEA RMSEA 
CI90 
SRMR 
Single Factor 
Model 
 
112.965** 35   .940 0.096 0.077 - 
0.116 
0.031 
Two-Factor 
Model 
 
81.430** 34   0.964 0.076 0.055  - 
0.098 
0.032 
   42.068** 1     
** = p < .001 
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Table 3 
Factor Loadings Based on Principal Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation for Items of the 
Empathic Concern for Victim, Empathic Anger (Statement-Based), and Moral Outrage 
Measures 
 
 
 Empathic Anger Empathic Concern 
for Victim 
I am angry at [the Aggressor] for behaving 
in a way that is absolutely not allowed. 
 
.77 
 
.42 
 
I am furious at [the Aggressor] because 
they violated an important  
moral standard. 
 
.87 
 
 
I am outraged at [the Aggressor] for 
breaking the rules. 
 
.80 
 
 
I am mad at [the Aggressor] because their 
behavior was unacceptable. 
 
.69 
 
.41 
 
[The Aggressor] enraged me by violating 
important principles. 
 
.85 
 
 
I am angry at [the Aggressor] for making 
[the Victim] suffer so much. 
 
.77 
 
.41 
 
I am furious at [the Aggressor] for how 
much pain they caused. 
 
.86 
 
 
I am mad at [the Aggressor] because of the 
agony they caused for [the Victim]. 
 
.75 
 
.41 
 
I am outraged with [the Aggressor] because 
of how they made [the Victim] feel. 
 
.84 
 
 
[The Aggressor] enraged me by causing 
[the Victim] so much anguish. 
 
.84 
 
 
Compassion  .84 
   
Sympathy  .81 
   
Concern  .80 
 
Care 
 
  
.82 
Tender-heartedness  .82 
Note. Factor loadings < .4 are suppressed.  
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Table 4 
Factor Loadings based on Principal Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation for Items of the 
Empathic Anger (Statement-Based), Moral Outrage, and Trait Anger Measures  
 
 Empathic Anger Trait Anger 1 Trait Anger 2 
I am angry at [the Aggressor] for 
behaving in a way that is 
absolutely not allowed. 
 
.86 
 
  
I am furious at [the Aggressor] 
because they violated an important  
moral standard. 
 
.89 
 
  
I am outraged at [the Aggressor] 
for breaking the rules. 
 
.80 
 
  
I am mad at [the Aggressor] 
because their behavior was 
unacceptable. 
 
.78 
 
  
[The Aggressor] enraged me by 
violating important principles. 
 
.88 
 
  
I am angry at [the Aggressor] for 
making [the Victim] suffer so 
much. 
 
.86 
 
  
I am furious at [the Aggressor] for 
how much pain they caused. 
 
.91 
 
  
I am mad at [the Aggressor] 
because of the agony they caused 
for [the Victim]. 
 
.84 
 
  
I am outraged with [the 
Aggressor] because of how they 
made [the Victim] feel. 
 
.88 
 
  
[The Aggressor] enraged me by 
causing [the Victim] so much 
anguish. 
 
.90 
 
  
It bothers me when I try to make a 
phone call and the line is busy. 
 
 .43 
 
 
I get very upset if I want to do 
something and my parents/other 
people won't let me. 
 
 .62 
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I get irritated when I have to stop 
doing something that I am 
enjoying. 
 
 .73 
 
 
It really annoys me to wait in long 
lines. 
 
 .54 
 
 
I get very frustrated when I make 
a mistake in my school work. 
 
  .73 
 
It frustrates me if people interrupt 
me when I'm talking. 
 
I get upset if I'm not able to do a 
task really well. 
 .48 
 
 
 
 
 
.49 
 
Note. Factor loadings < .4 are suppressed.  
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Table 5 
Factor Loadings Based on Principal Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation for Items of the 
Statement-Based Empathic Anger, Adjective-Based Empathic Anger, Moral Outrage, and 
Aggressor Blaming Measures 
 
 Empathic Anger Anger/Hostility Aggressor 
Blaming 
I am angry at [the Aggressor] for 
behaving in a way that is 
absolutely not allowed. 
 
.75   
I am furious at [the Aggressor] 
because they violated an important  
moral standard. 
 
.79   
I am outraged at [the Aggressor] 
for breaking the rules. 
 
.76   
I am mad at [the Aggressor] 
because their behavior was 
unacceptable. 
 
.58  .41 
[The Aggressor] enraged me by 
violating important principles. 
 
.75   
I am angry at [the Aggressor] for 
making [the Victim] suffer so 
much. 
 
.71  .43 
I am furious at [the Aggressor] for 
how much pain they caused. 
 
.76 -.42  
I am mad at [the Aggressor] 
because of the agony they caused 
for [the Victim]. 
 
.66   
I am outraged with [the 
Aggressor] because of how they 
made [the Victim] feel. 
 
.73   
[The Aggressor] enraged me by 
causing [the Victim] so much 
anguish. 
 
.74 -.45  
Mad  .72  
Angry  .82  
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Furious  .86  
Resentful 
 
 .68  
Irritated  .67  
Enraged  .84  
Aggravated  .80  
Outraged  .78  
Blame   .77 
Dislike   .79 
Anger .45  .63 
Disapproval   .88 
Condemnation .42  .62 
Note. Factor loadings < .4 are suppressed. 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Data by Audio Segment 
   M  SD Range 
State Empathic Anger (Statement-Based 
Measure) 
Bullying  
Drunk Driver 
Mugging 
 
 
3.91 
3.85 
3.99 
 
1.00 
1.00 
.94 
 
1 - 5 
1 - 5 
1 – 5 
    
State Empathic Concern for Victim 
Bullying  
Drunk Driver 
Mugging 
 
 
 
4.14 
4.14 
4.12 
 
.94 
.95 
.94 
 
1 - 5 
1 - 5 
1 – 5 
    
   
State Empathic Concern for Aggressor 
Bullying  
Drunk Driver 
Mugging 
 
 
2.07 
2.11 
 
1.20 
1.15 
 
1 - 5 
1 – 5 
1.95 1.09 1 - 5 
    
    
Punishing Desires 
Bullying  
Drunk Driver 
Mugging 
 
 
3.13 
3.06 
 
1.60 
1.69 
 
1 - 7 
1 – 7 
3.29 
 
1.59 
 
1 - 7 
 
Helping Desires 
Bullying  
Drunk Driver 
Mugging 
 
  
5.02 
5.13 
5.06 
 
 
1.37 
1.35 
1.39 
 
 
1 - 7 
1.80 – 7 
1 - 7 
 
Victim Blaming 
Bullying  
Drunk Driver 
Mugging 
 
  
1.66 
1.69 
1.66 
 
 
.97 
1.03 
.96 
 
 
 
1 - 5 
1 - 5 
1 - 5 
 
Aggressor Blaming 
Bullying  
Drunk Driver 
Mugging 
 
  
3.90 
3.90 
4.06 
 
 
1.14 
.99 
1.01 
 
 
 
1 - 5 
1 - 5 
1 - 5 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
Table 7 
Descriptive Data Collapsing Across Scenarios 
  M SD Range 
State Empathic Anger (Statement-Based Measure) 
 
3.92 0.87 1-5 
   
State Empathic Concern for Victim 4.13 0.81 2-5 
   
   
State Empathic Concern for Aggressor 2.04 0.95 1-5 
   
   
   
Punishing Desires 3.16 1.47 1-7 
   
Helping Desires 
 
 5.07 
 
1.26 
 
1.73-7 
 
Victim Blaming 
 
 1.67 
 
0.86 
 
 
1-4.2 
 
Aggressor Blaming 
 
Trait Perspective 
Taking 
 3.95 
 
1.79 
 
0.85 
 
0.74 
 
 
 
1.07-5 
 
-0.14-3.29 
 
 
Trait Anger 
 
 3.42 
 
0.67 
 
2-5 
Justice Orientation 
 
Care Orientation 
 
 
 .45 
 
.55 
 
0.14 
 
0.14 
 
0.15-0.80 
 
0.20-0.85 
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Table 8 
Bivariate Correlations  
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Table 9 
 
Descriptive Data by Gender 
   Male   Female  
  Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
        
State Empathic Anger 
(Statement-Based 
Measure) 
 
3.74** .84 1.4 - 5 4.09** 
 
.86 
 
1 - 5 
 
      
State Empathic 
Concern for Victim 
3.86** .82 2.13 - 5 4.39** .71 2 - 5 
      
      
State Empathic 
Concern for Aggressor 
2.18* 1.00 1 - 5 1.90* .89 1 - 5 
      
      
      
Punishing Desires 3.37* 
 
1.31 
 
1.87 - 5 
 
2.96* 
 
1.58 
 
1 - 7 
 
      
Helping 
Desires 
 
 4.65** 
 
1.11 
 
2.27 - 7 
 
5.47** 
 
1.27 
 
1.73 - 7 
 
Victim 
Blaming 
 
 1.94** 
 
 
.93 
 
1 – 4.07 
 
1.42** 
 
 
.70 
 
1 – 4.2 
 
Aggressor 
Blaming 
 
Trait 
Perspective 
Taking 
 
 3.78** 
 
 
 
1.69* 
 
.92 
 
 
 
.68 
 
1.07 - 5 
 
 
 
.29 – 3.29 
 
4.12** 
 
 
 
1.88* 
 
 
.76 
 
 
 
.78 
1.27 - 5 
 
 
 
-.14 – 
3.29 
Trait Anger 
 
 3.36 
 
 
.67 
 
2 – 4.86 
 
3.47 
 
 
.67 
 
2 - 5 
 
Trait Empathy 
 
 27.27** 
 
11.30 
 
8.33 - 60 
 
34.49** 
 
12.85 
 
7.67 - 62 
 
Justice 
Orientation 
 
Care 
Orientation 
 
 .48** 
 
 
.52** 
.13 
 
 
.13 
 
.15 - .78 
 
 
.23 - .85 
 
.43** 
 
 
.57** 
 
 
.14 
 
 
.14 
 
.15 - .80 
 
 
.20 - .85 
 
 
** = p < 0.01 
* = p < 0.05  
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Table 10 
Regression Model for Predicting State Empathic Anger (Statement-Based Measure) 
 
β at Final Step 
Predictor  
Age 0.05 
Gender 0.07 
Ethnicity 0.03 
Trait Anger 0.23** 
Victim Blaming 
Perspective Taking  
-0.39** 
0.16** 
** = p < 0.01 
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Table 11 
Regression Model for Predicting Helping Desires 
 
β at Final Step  
Predictor  
Age -0.16 
Gender 0.14** 
Ethnicity 0.04 
Empathic Anger (Statement-Based 
Measure) 
0.21** 
Empathic Concern for Victim 0.51** 
Care Orientation 0.12* 
Victim Blaming -0.37* 
Age*Empathic Concern for Victim -0.16 
Age*Victim Blaming 0.57* 
** = p < 0.01 
* = p < 0.05 
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Table 12 
Regression Model for Predicting Punishing Desires 
 
β at Final Step 
Predictor  
Age -0.36 
Gender -0.13* 
Ethnicity -0.45* 
Empathic Anger (Statement-Based 
Measure) 
0.44* 
Empathic Concern for Aggressor -0.21 
Age*Ethnicity 1.14** 
Age*Empathic Anger -0.08 
Age*Empathic Concern for 
Aggressor 
0.42 
Age*Aggressor Blaming -0.49 
** = p < 0.01 
* = p < 0.05 
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Appendix 
 
Audio Transcript-Bullying (Adolescent) 
Hi, I’m Annie/Alex. I’m supposed to tell you about bullying. When I started my 
freshman year at high school, I got bullied. It got bad. I walked through the high school 
hallway with my head down. I rarely talked to anyone. I went to school one day and it was 
the worst day of my life. Sarah/Sam had started a rumor about me. Some of the stuff she/he 
said made the girls/boys very mad at me and want to fight me. I was on the soccer team, and 
during practice Sarah/Sam tackled me really hard. I didn’t even have the ball. She/he 
slammed me on to the ground and kicked my back and head. I had to go the hospital. The 
doctors said I got a concussion from the fall, and fractured one of the bones in my back. 
I missed a lot of school while I was in the hospital, and now my grades are awful. My 
back hurts all the time and I can’t do sports anymore. It hurts just to carry my books around. 
People are still picking on me. I come home from school every day crying because it just 
never stops. I don’t have any friends left; nobody wants to hang out with because of the 
rumors. I don’t know why they started saying these things about me and now they just won’t 
stop. I feel so lost. I’m all alone and I don’t know how to fix any of this. 
I guess that’s it, that’s my experience with bullying. Thanks for listening. 
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Broadcast Information Sheet-Bullying (Adolescent) 
Sarah/Sam M. was a high school student known for being aggressive and harassing 
other students. Her/His aggression was always unprovoked, and her/his victims appear to 
have been selected at random. At the start of the school year, Sarah/Sam began targeting a 
freshman student named Annie/Alex P. The two had never met before and there was no prior 
history of conflict between them. Sarah/Sam would verbally abuse Annie/Alex, insulting and 
harassing her/him between classes. Sarah/Sam then began circulating malicious rumors about 
Annie/Alex, which Sarah/Sam knew were untrue. Sarah/Sam and Annie/Alex were both 
members of the soccer team. During practice, Sarah/Sam deliberately tackled Annie/Alex, 
causing her/him to fall to the ground. There were numerous witnesses to the incident who 
confirmed that Sarah/Sam acted deliberately, and that Annie/Alex did nothing to provoke 
Sarah/Sam. Annie/Alex suffered a concussion and several fractured vertebrae. 
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Audio Transcript-Bullying (Adult) 
Hi, I’m Annie/Alex. I’m supposed to tell you about workplace bullying. When I 
started my new job, I got bullied. It got bad. I walked through the office hallway with my 
head down. I rarely talked to anyone. I went to work one day and it was the worst day of my 
life. Sarah/Sam had started a rumor about me. Some of the stuff she/he said made the other 
employees very mad at me and want to fight me. I was on the office soccer team, and during 
practice Sarah/Sam tackled me really hard. I didn’t even have the ball. She/he slammed me 
on to the ground and kicked my back and head. I had to go the hospital. The doctors said I got 
a concussion from the fall, and fractured one of the bones in my back. 
I missed a lot of wok while I was in the hospital, and now my performance reviews 
are awful. My back hurts all the time and I can’t do sports anymore. It hurts just to carry my 
laptop around. People are still picking on me. I come home from work every day crying 
because it just never stops. I don’t have any friends left; nobody wants to hang out with 
because of the rumors. I don’t know why they started saying these things about me and now 
they just won’t stop. I feel so lost. I’m all alone and I don’t know how to fix any of this. 
I guess that’s it, that’s my experience with workplace bullying. Thanks for listening. 
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Broadcast Information Sheet-Bullying (Adult) 
Sarah/Sam M. was an employee known for being aggressive and harassing other 
workers. Her/His aggression was always unprovoked, and her/his victims appear to have been 
selected at random. At the start of the fiscal year, Sarah/Sam began targeting a new employee 
named Annie/Alex P. The two had never met before and there was no prior history of conflict 
between them. Sarah/Sam would verbally abuse Annie/Alex, insulting and harassing her/him 
between meetings. Sarah/Sam then began circulating malicious rumors about Annie/Alex, 
which Sarah/Sam knew were untrue. Sarah/Sam and Annie/Alex were both placed on a 
soccer team as part of an office team-building initiative. During practice, Sarah/Sam 
deliberately tackled Annie/Alex, causing her/him to fall to the ground. There were numerous 
witnesses to the incident who confirmed that Sarah/Sam acted deliberately, and that 
Annie/Alex did nothing to provoke Sarah/Sam. Annie/Alex suffering a concussion and 
several fractured vertebrae. 
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Audio Transcript-Mugging (Adolescent) 
I’m Meghan/Matthew. They asked me to come in to talk about the time I got mugged. 
I was walking home from a night out to celebrate finishing final exams, when a girl/guy in a 
hoodie came up from behind me. The police said he hit me around the head with a brick, and 
I got knocked out. She/he took my phone and my wallet. I came around for a moment and 
was wondering why my head was wet. I realized it was blood and a wave of panic came over 
me then. I'd never felt so vulnerable in my life, lying there on the sidewalk. Someone saw me 
and called an ambulance. I had to have emergency surgery to control the pressure on my 
brain and stop more damage from happening. I got four fractures around my left eye, and I 
still can't open it fully. 
The pain of the injury’s nothing in comparison to the mental pain I feel now. I feel 
completely trapped. I’m too scared to walk to school, or even go to the store down the block. 
It’s absolute hell. I don’t want to leave my room. My mind keeps coming up with scenarios 
of how someone's going to attack me. I’m constantly thinking about where the next attack is 
going to come from. I keep having nightmares and I can’t sleep. My head hurts a lot. I get 
angry about little things that don’t matter. All this fear and anger, it’s making it so hard to 
stay friends with people. I feel so alone. I wish this had never happened to me. 
So, yeah. That’s the story of the time I got mugged. Thanks. 
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Broadcast Information Sheet-Mugging (Adolescent) 
Diane/David H. was a high school student from a middle-class background. She/he 
had previously been arrested for cornering another student who was walking home after dark 
and threatening them with a lead pipe until the student surrendered his wallet and phone. On 
the night in question, Diane/David knew several students were holding a party to celebrate 
the completion of their final exams. She/he knew where the party was being held and at what 
time, but was unaware of who specifically would be attending. Diane/David obtained a brick 
from a nearby construction site and waited in an unlit area near the location of the party. The 
area she/he was waiting in had a reputation for being a safe place where people felt 
comfortable walking alone at night. When Diane/David saw Meghan/Matthew E. returning 
from the party alone, she/he approached her from behind and struck Meghan/Matthew in the 
head with the brick. Diane/David and Meghan did not know each other, and Diane/David’s 
attack was purely opportunistic.  
When the Meghan/Matthew collapsed, Diane/David searched through her/his 
belongings, taking her/his phone and wallet before fleeing the scene. A couple walking their 
dog witnessed the attack and called an ambulance. Police found the brick used in the attack 
nearby, and identified Diane/David’s fingerprint on it. Meghan/Matthew suffered a skull 
fracture, in addition to multiple fractures in the bone around her/his left eye. Emergency 
surgery was required to ensure Meghan/Matthew would not suffer lasting brain damage. 
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Audio Transcript-Mugging (Adult) 
I’m Meghan/Matthew. They asked me to come in to talk about the time I got mugged. 
I was walking home from a night out to celebrate a friend’s promotion, when a woman/man 
in a hoodie came up from behind me. The police said she/he hit me around the head with a 
brick, and I got knocked out. She/he took my phone and my wallet. I came around for a 
moment and was wondering why my head was wet. I realized it was blood and a wave of 
panic came over me then. I'd never felt so vulnerable in my life, lying there on the sidewalk. 
Someone saw me and called an ambulance. I had to have emergency surgery to control the 
pressure on my brain and stop more damage from happening. I got four fractures around my 
left eye, and I still can't open it fully. 
The pain of the injury’s nothing in comparison to the mental pain I feel now. I feel 
completely trapped. I’m too scared to walk to work, or even go to the store down the block. 
It’s absolute hell. I don’t want to leave my room. My mind keeps coming up with scenarios 
of how someone's going to attack me. I’m constantly thinking about where the next attack is 
going to come from. I keep having nightmares and I can’t sleep. My head hurts a lot. I get 
angry about little things that don’t matter. All this fear and anger, it’s making it so hard to 
stay friends with people. I feel so alone. I wish this had never happened to me. 
So, yeah. That’s the story of the time I got mugged. Thanks. 
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Broadcast Information Sheet-Mugging (Adult) 
Diane/David H. was an office worker from a middle-class background. She/he had 
previously been arrested for cornering another individual who was walking home after dark 
and threatening them with a lead pipe until the individual surrendered his wallet and phone. 
On the night in question, Diane/David knew several people were holding a party to celebrate 
the promotion of a friend. She/he knew where the party was being held and at what time, but 
was unaware of who specifically would be attending. Diane/David obtained a brick from a 
nearby construction site and waited in an unlit area near the location of the party. The area 
she/he was waiting in had a reputation for being a safe place where people felt comfortable 
walking alone at night. When Diane/David saw Meghan/Matthew E. returning from the party 
alone, she/he approached her from behind and struck Meghan/Matthew in the head with the 
brick. Diane/David and Meghan did not know each other, and Diane/David’s attack was 
purely opportunistic.  
When the Meghan/Matthew collapsed, Diane/David searched through her/his 
belongings, taking her/his phone and wallet before fleeing the scene. A couple walking their 
dog witnessed the attack and called an ambulance. Police found the brick used in the attack 
nearby, and identified Diane/David’s fingerprint on it. Meghan/Matthew suffered a skull 
fracture, in addition to multiple fractures in the bone around her/his left eye. Emergency 
surgery was required to ensure Meghan/Matthew would not suffer lasting brain damage. 
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Audio Transcript-Drunk Driver (Adolescent) 
My name is Susan/Steven. The radio station asked me to come in today to discuss my 
experiences with drunk driving. I’m a high school student, or at least I was, until I stepped off 
the curb and was hit by a car. They rushed me to the hospital. The police were taking reports 
trying to figure out what had happened. And I overheard them say that the driver of the car 
that hit me was drunk. She/he shattered my thigh bone. She/he ripped up my right leg. I had 
cracked ribs and bruises, and they rushed me into surgery, but the doctor says I still might 
have a permanent limp. He says that I still might need even more operations to correct the 
damage that was done to my leg. 
 It hurts so much. Now I have to go to physical therapy to try to get the use back into 
my leg. It’s just, not fair. I don’t even get to see my friends, to talk to them the way I used to. 
I’m so lonely all the time. I can’t go anywhere unless someone comes to pick me up. If they 
do, I’m usually on my way to physical therapy. I can’t go to my classes. I’m so angry that this 
has happened to me.  Why did this girl/guy have to hit me? 
 I just don’t know what to do. I don’t know how I’m going to finish school. I don’t 
know what’s going to happen to my life. So, that’s my experience with drunk driving. Thanks 
for listening. 
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Broadcast Information Sheet-Drunk Driver (Adolescent) 
Robert/Rebecca L. was in the habit of driving himself/herself home from a local bar 
after having several drinks in the evening. Two months ago, he/she was spotted weaving 
down the highway and received a ticket for driving while intoxicated. One of the penalties for 
this violation was having his/her driver’s license restricted for six months; during this period 
his/her license was valid only for driving to and from work. He/She had decided, however, 
that it was unlikely that he/she would be caught driving other places so he/she generally 
ignored the restriction. One night after having several drinks at a bar, Robert/Rebecca 
realized that he/she was late to meet a friend. As he/she drove to their meeting place, he/she 
sped up in order to make a right turn at an upcoming intersection before the light turned red. 
As he/she approached the corner, Robert/Rebecca did not notice the girl/boy (Susan/Steven 
T.) who had just stepped off the curb to cross the street onto which Robert/Rebecca was 
turning. The “WALK” light had just come on, indicating that Susan/Steven was allowed to 
cross at that time. As Robert/Rebecca rounded the corner, he/she finally spotted 
Susan/Steven, but he/she was too late in applying his/her breaks and struck Susan/Steven 
with his/her fender, knocking her/him to the ground. The police and an ambulance arrived 
quickly. The police officer noticed Robert/Rebecca’s apparent intoxication and administered 
a breathalyzer test which determined that the concentration of alcohol in Robert/Rebecca’s 
system was easily high enough to label him/her legally intoxicated and to significantly impair 
his/her judgement, reaction time, and vision. As the police dealt with Robert/Rebecca, the 
ambulance rushed Susan/Steven to a nearby hospital for tests and treatment. Susan/Steven 
had suffered multiple lacerations, a broken leg, a cracked rib, and severe bruises. 
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Audio Transcript-Drunk Driver (Adult) 
My name is Susan/Steven. The radio station asked me to come in today to discuss my 
experiences with drunk driving. I’m a secretary, or at least I was, until I stepped off the curb 
and was hit by a car. They rushed me to the hospital. The police were taking reports trying to 
figure out what had happened. And I overheard them say that the driver of the car that hit me 
was drunk. She/he shattered my thigh bone. She/he ripped up my right leg. I had cracked ribs 
and bruises, and they rushed me into surgery, but the doctor says I still might have a 
permanent limp. He says that I still might need even more operations to correct the damage 
that was done to my leg. 
 It hurts so much. Now I have to go to physical therapy to try to get the use back into 
my leg. It’s just, not fair. I don’t even get to see my friends, to talk to them the way I used to. 
I’m so lonely all the time. I can’t go anywhere unless someone comes to pick me up. If they 
do, I’m usually on my way to physical therapy. I can’t go to work. I’m so angry that this has 
happened to me.  Why did this girl/guy have to hit me? 
 I just don’t know what to do. I don’t know how I’m going to keep my job. I don’t 
know what’s going to happen to my life. So, that’s my experience with drunk driving. Thanks 
for listening. 
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Broadcast Information Sheet-Drunk Driver (Adult) 
Robert/Rebecca L. was in the habit of driving himself/herself home from a local bar 
after having several drinks in the evening. Two months ago, he/she was spotted weaving 
down the highway and received a ticket for driving while intoxicated. One of the penalties for 
this violation was having his/her driver’s license restricted for six months; during this period 
his/her license was valid only for driving to and from work. He/She had decided, however, 
that it was unlikely that he/she would be caught driving other places so he/she generally 
ignored the restriction. One night after having several drinks at a bar, Robert/Rebecca 
realized that he/she was late to meet a friend. As he/she drove to their meeting place, he/she 
sped up in order to make a right turn at an upcoming intersection before the light turned red. 
As he/she approached the corner, Robert/Rebecca did not notice the woman/man 
(Susan/Steven T.) who had just stepped off the curb to cross the street onto which 
Robert/Rebecca was turning. The “WALK” light had just come on, indicating that 
Susan/Steven was allowed to cross at that time. As Robert/Rebecca rounded the corner, 
he/she finally spotted Susan/Steven, but he/she was too late in applying his/her breaks and 
struck Susan/Steven with his/her fender, knocking her/him to the ground. The police and an 
ambulance arrived quickly. The police officer noticed Robert/Rebecca’s apparent intoxication 
and administered a breathalyzer test which determined that the concentration of alcohol in 
Robert/Rebecca’s system was easily high enough to label him/her legally intoxicated and to 
significantly impair his/her judgement, reaction time, and vision. As the police dealt with 
Robert/Rebecca, the ambulance rushed Susan/Steven to a nearby hospital for tests and 
treatment. Susan/Steven had suffered multiple lacerations, a broken leg, a cracked rib, and 
severe bruises. 
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Broadcast Response Sheet (Helping and Punishing Desire Measure) 
On this brief survey, we are interested in your reactions to the broadcast you just read about 
and listened to. Please read the questions carefully, and respond as honestly as you can to 
each one. 
 
1: If you could, how likely is it that you would engage in each of the following actions in 
response to the broadcast? In providing your answer, please write the appropriate number in 
the blank to the left of each statement. 
 
[1-7 Likert scale; 1 is not likely at all, 3 is somewhat likely, 7 is very likely] 
 
_ 1: Talk with [the victim] about her/his feelings. (H) 
_2: Send an anonymous message to [the aggressor] expressing anger at his/her actions (P) 
_3: Run small errands for [the victim] until she/he gets better (H) 
_4: Help [the victim] perform tasks they find difficult (H) 
_5: Post signs where [the aggressor] lives to let his/her neighbors know what he/she did (P) 
_6: Contact a local TV news station and encourage them to televise a picture of [the 
aggressor] and inform others of what he/she did (P) 
_7: Spend time with [the victim] to keep her/him from feeling lonely (H) 
_8:  Post anonymous messages online telling people about what [the aggressor] did (P) 
_9: Contribute money to a fund to help repay [the victim]’s medical bills (H) 
_10: Send a message to the editor of a local newspaper expressing your outrage at [the 
aggressor]’s actions (P) 
Note. (H) = denotes a helping item; (P) = denotes a punishing item 
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State Empathic Concern for Victim Measure 
Please read the following statements. Using a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very Well), please 
rate to what extent do you feel each of the following toward [Victim]? 
 
1: Compassion 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
2: Sympathy 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
3: Concern 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
4: Care 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
5: Tender-heartedness 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
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State Empathic Concern for Aggressor Measure 
Please read the following statements. Using a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very Well), please 
rate to what extent do you feel each of the following toward [Aggressor]? 
 
1: Compassion 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
2: Sympathy 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
3: Concern 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
4: Care 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
5: Tender-heartedness 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
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State Blame for Victim Measure 
Please read the following statements. Using a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very Well), please 
rate to what extent do you feel each of the following toward [Victim]? 
 
1: Blame 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
2: Dislike 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
3: Anger 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
4: Disapproval 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
5: Condemnation 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
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State Blame for Aggressor Measure 
Please read the following statements. Using a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very Well), please 
rate to what extent do you feel each of the following toward [Aggressor]. 
 
1: Blame 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
2: Dislike 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
3: Anger 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
4: Disapproval 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
5: Condemnation 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
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State Moral Outrage Measure 
Please read the following statements. Using a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very Well), please 
rate to how well each of the following describe you. 
 
1: I am angry at [the Aggressor] for behaving in a way that is absolutely not allowed. 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
2: I am furious at [the Aggressor] because they violated an important moral standard. 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
3: I am outraged at [the Aggressor] for breaking the rules. 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
4: I am mad at [the Aggressor] because their behavior was unacceptable. 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
5: [The Aggressor] enraged me by violating important principles. 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
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Statement-Based State Empathic Anger Measure 
Please read the following statements. Using a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very Well), please 
rate to how well each of the following describe you. 
 
1: I am angry at [the Aggressor] for making [the Victim] suffer so much. 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
2: I am furious at [the Aggressor] for how much pain they caused. 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
3: I am mad at [the Aggressor] because of the agony they caused for [the Victim]. 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
4: I am outraged with [the Aggressor] because of how they made [the Victim] feel. 
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
5: [The Aggressor] enraged me by causing [the Victim] so much anguish.  
1 (Not at all)   2   3 (Somewhat)   4   5 (Very Well) 
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Modified Batson’s Emotional Response Questionnaire-Empathic Anger Subscale (Adjective-
Based State Empathic Anger Measure) 
Please rate the following adjectives on a 1 to 7 scale based on how well they describe your 
feelings in response to the audio segment. 
 
Mad 
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (Extremely Well) 
Angry 
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (Extremely Well) 
Furious 
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (Extremely Well) 
Resentful  
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (Extremely Well) 
Irritated 
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (Extremely Well) 
Enraged 
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (Extremely Well) 
Aggravated 
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (Extremely Well) 
Outraged 
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (Extremely Well) 
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Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright’s Empathy Quotient (Trait Empathy Measure) 
 
How to Fill Out the Questionnaire:  
Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and rate how strongly you 
agree or disagree with it by circling your answer. There are no right or wrong answers, or 
trick questions. IN ORDER FOR THE SCALE TO BE VALID, YOU MUST ANSWER 
EVERY QUESTION.  
 
Examples  
E1. I would be very upset if I couldn’t listen to music. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
E2. I prefer to speak to my friends on the phone rather than write letters to them.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
E3. I have no desire to travel to different parts of the world.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
E4. I prefer to read than to dance.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
 
1. I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
2. I prefer animals to humans.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
3. I try to keep up with the current trends and fashions.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
4. I find it difficult to explain to others things that I understand easily, when they don’t 
understand it. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
5. I dream most nights. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree . 
 
6. I really enjoy caring for other people.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
7. I try to solve my own problems rather than discussing them with others. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
8. I find it hard to know what to do in a social situation.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
9. I am at my best first thing in the morning.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
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10. People often tell me that I went too far in driving my point home in a discussion.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
11. It doesn’t bother me too much if I am late meeting a friend.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
12. Friendships and relationships are just too difficult, so I tend not to bother with them.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
13. I would never break a law, no matter how minor.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
14. I often find it difficult to judge if something is rude or polite. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
15. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own thoughts rather than on what my listener 
might be thinking.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
16. I prefer practical jokes to verbal humor.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
17. I live life for today rather than the future. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
18. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms to see what would happen.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
19. I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but means another.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
20. I tend to have very strong opinions about morality.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
21. It is hard for me to see why some things upset people so much.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
22. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
23. I think that good manners are the most important thing a parent can teach their child. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
24. I like to do things on the spur of the moment.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
25. I am good at predicting how someone will feel.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
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26. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling awkward or uncomfortable.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
27. If I say something that someone else is offended by, I think that that’s their problem, not 
mine.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
28. If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I would reply truthfully, even if I didn’t like it.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
29. I can’t always see why someone should have felt offended by a remark.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
30. People often tell me that I am very unpredictable.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
31. I enjoy being the center of attention at any social gathering.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
32. Seeing people cry doesn’t really upset me.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
33. I enjoy having discussions about politics.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
34. I am very blunt, which some people take to be rudeness, even though this is unintentional.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
35. I don’t tend to find social situations confusing.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
36. Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what they are 
thinking.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
37. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their experiences rather than my own.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
38. It upsets me to see an animal in pain.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
39. I am able to make decisions without being influenced by people’s feelings.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
40. I can’t relax until I have done everything I had planned to do that day.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
41. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored with what I am saying.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
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42. I get upset if I see people suffering on news programmes.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
43. Friends usually talk to me about their problems as they say that I am very understanding.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
44. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person doesn’t tell me. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
45. I often start new hobbies but quickly become bored with them and move on to something 
else.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
46. People sometimes tell me that I have gone too far with teasing.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
47. I would be too nervous to go on a big rollercoaster.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
48. Other people often say that I am insensitive, though I don’t always see why.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
49. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to them to make an effort to join in.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
50. I usually stay emotionally detached when watching a film.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
51. I like to be very organized in day-to-day life and often make lists of the chores I have to 
do.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree   
 
52. I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly and intuitively.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
53. I don’t like to take risks.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
54. I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
55. I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
56. Before making a decision I always weigh up the pros and cons.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
57. I don’t consciously work out the rules of social situations.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
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58. I am good at predicting what someone will do. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
59. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems.  
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
60. I can usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even if I don’t agree with it. 
strongly agree  slightly agree  slightly disagree  strongly disagree  
 
 
Thank you for filling this questionnaire in. 
 
 
 
 
Scoring the EQ  
“Definitely agree” responses scored 2 points and “slightly agree” responses scored 1 point on 
the following items: 1, 6, 19, 22, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 
60. 
“Definitely disagree” responses scored 2 points and “slightly disagree” responses scored 1 
point on the following items: 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 21, 27, 28, 29, 32, 34, 39, 46, 48, 49, 
50. 
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Davis' Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)-Perspective Taking Subscale (Trait Perspective 
Taking Measure) 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations.  
For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on the scale 
at the top of the page:  A, B, C, D, or E.  When you have decided on your answer, fill in the 
letter on the answer sheet next to the item number.  READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY 
BEFORE RESPONDING.  Answer as honestly as you can.  Thank you. 
 
ANSWER SCALE: 
  A                   B               C               D               E 
 DOES NOT                                                        DESCRIBES ME 
 DESCRIBE ME                                                 VERY 
 WELL                                                                WELL 
 
1.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (PT) (-) 
 
2.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT) 
 
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective. (PT) 
 
4. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
arguments. (PT) (-) 
 
5.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. (PT) 
 
6.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. (PT) 
 
7.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
(PT) 
 
NOTE: (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion 
  PT = perspective-taking scale 
  FS = fantasy scale 
  EC = empathic concern scale 
  PD = personal distress scale 
 
  A = 0 
  B = 1 
  C = 2 
  D = 3 
  E = 4 
Except for reversed-scored items, which are scored: 
  A = 4 
  B = 3 
  C = 2 
  D = 1 
  E = 0  
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Early Adolescent Temperament Questionnaire - Revised 
Short Form (Trait Anger Measure) 
 
 
Directions 
 
 On the following page you will find a series of statements that people might use to 
describe themselves.  The statements refer to a wide number of activities and attitudes. 
 
 For each statement, please circle the answer that best describes how true each 
statement is for you.  There are no best answers.  People are very different in how they feel 
about these statements.  Please circle the first answer that comes to you. 
 
You will use the following scale to describe how true or false a statement is about you: 
 
  Circle number:  If the statement is: 
 
   1   Almost always untrue of you 
 
   2   Usually untrue of you 
 
   3   Sometimes true, sometimes untrue of you 
 
   4   Usually true of you 
 
   5   Almost always true of you 
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 How true is each statement for 
you?  
Almost 
always 
untrue 
Usually 
untrue 
Sometimes  
true, 
sometimes 
untrue 
Usually 
true 
Almost 
always 
true 
1) It bothers me when I try to make 
a phone call and the line is busy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2) I get very upset if I want to do 
something and my parents won't 
let me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3) I get irritated when I have to 
stop doing something that I am 
enjoying. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4) It really annoys me to wait in 
long lines. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5) I get very frustrated when I 
make a mistake in my school 
work. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6) It frustrates me if people 
interrupt me when I'm talking. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7) I get upset if I'm not able to do a 
task really well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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World View Questionnaire (Care/Justice Moral Orientation Measure) 
Circle the contrasting adjective you think is more important to you personally. 
 
1. Logic     Intuition 
2. Compromise    Power 
3. Talent development   Giving to others 
4. Kindness     Character 
5. Consistency    Forgiveness 
6. Helping others    Law-abiding 
7. Freedom     Children 
8. Happy marriage    Doing what is right 
9. Organized     Creative 
10. Family unity    Personal accomplishment 
11. Truth     Goodness 
12. Feeling     Facts 
13. Tangible     Faith 
14. What people are like inside  What people do 
15. Money     Time 
16. Flexible     Stable 
17. Truth is known by results  Truth is self-evident 
18. Those we love    Self 
19. Self-development    Family development 
20. Knowledge for application  Knowledge for its own sake 
21. Justice     Mercy 
22. Innocence    Maturity 
23. Scientific knowledge   Spiritual knowledge 
24. Human relationships   Moral law 
25. Principles     People 
26. Enjoy people    Enjoy work 
27. Determination    Patience 
28. Getting along with others  Achievement  
29. Sense of right    Sensitivity to others 
30. Spontaneous    Knowledgeable 
31. Success     Friends 
32. Tactfulness    Honesty 
33. Educating the mind   Educating the heart 
34. Intentions     Deeds 
35. Law-abiding    Caring 
36. Understanding others   Influencing others 
37. Competitive ability   Cooperative ability 
38. Loyalty     Leadership 
39. Being in charge    Helping 
40. Service to others    Respect for others 
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